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AVAILABILITY OF CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER
THE GRAND JURY SECRECY RULE
JoEllen Lotvedt+
The grand jury is an integral part of the American criminal justice system.' Through the grand jury process, the government has extraordinary
+ J.D. candidate, May 1998, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1.

See PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1-

3 (3d ed. Supp. 1997). Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
every person "held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime," is granted the
right to "a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The requirement that a criminal indictment be initiated by a grand jury currently does not exist
in the state court system. See Janice S. Peterson, Note, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e): Criminal or Civil Contempt for Violations of Grand Jury Secrecy?, 12 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 245, 254 (1990). Michigan was the first state to eliminate the grand jury
procedure in 1859. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY:

AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 16 (1975); Peterson, supra, at 254. In 1884, the United States
Supreme Court determined that the grand jury indictment process did not apply to the
states. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment right to a grand jury is not applicable to prosecutions by the state); see also
Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 688 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Aldridge v. Marshall, 765 F.2d
63, 68 (6th Cir. 1985)).
There are two types of grand juries in the federal criminal justice system: the "regular"
grand jury and the "special" grand jury. See DIAMOND, supra, § 2.01[A], at 2-3. A regular grand jury is impaneled pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(a); a special
grand jury is impaneled pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3332 (1994). See id. § 2.01[A][1][2], at 2-4 to 2-5.
Rule 6(a) provides that a federal district court "shall order one or more grand juries to
be summoned at such time as the public interest requires." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a). A
federal court has almost complete discretion with regard to impaneling a grand jury. See
DIAMOND, supra, § 2.01[A][1], at 2-4; see also In re A & H Transp., Inc., 319 F.2d 69, 71
(4th Cir. 1963) (underscoring the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 6 to
convene grand juries); O'Bryan v. Chandler, 249 F. Supp. 51, 55 (W.D. Okla. 1964) (stating that a federal district court creates the grand jury, which does not exist independently
from the court), affd, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965). Federal courts are not limited in the
number of grand juries they may impanel. See DIAMOND, supra, § 2.01[A][1], at 2-4.
Rule 6 provides only that a court may impanel the number of grand juries as "the public
interest requires." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a); see also United States v. Brown, 36 F.R.D. 204,
205 (D.D.C. 1964) (noting that usually the local United States Attorney and the district
court consult to determine the number of grand juries needed). The regular grand jury is
impaneled for 18 months, which may be extended by six months "upon a determination
that such extension is in the public interest." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g).
In 1970, Congress created the special grand jury for use in investigating organized
crime. See DIAMOND, supra, § 2.01[A][2], at 2-5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3332 (1994)).
At least once every 18 months, each district court sitting in a district with a population of
more than 4 million must impanel a grand jury See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3331(a) (1994)).
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power to investigate criminal activities Federal prosecutors are, however, prohibited from abusing this power or exceeding the authority
granted to them under the United States Constitution.3 A United States
Attorney-more than any other public officer in the federal criminal justice system-pursues two substantive ends: the administration of justice
and the protection of society.' A constant challenge for the legal system
is to develop safeguards so that the zealous pursuit of these objectives
does not itself become a miscarriage of justice
The grand jury originated in England' as a mechanism to serve the
crown.' The American grand jury acts as an investigatory body,8 serving
An Attorney General also can request a grand jury at any time. See id. The district court
has almost complete discretion to extend the term of a special grand jury for up to 36
months. See id. at 2-6; see also Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926, 933 (7th Cir. 1973)
(holding that a district court's decision to extend the term of the special grand jury is unreviewable absent serious abuse of discretion by the court).
Both regular and special grand juries are comprised of 16 to 23 "legally qualified persons" that are summoned by judicial order of the district court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a).
Although no specific quorum requirement exists, courts have interpreted Rule 6 to require 16 individuals to be present, 12 of whom must concur in an indictment. See
DIAMOND, supra, § 2.02[B], at 2-9.
2. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 1-3 (elaborating upon the grand jury's immense
investigative power by noting that the invocation of privileges rarely interferes with a
grand jury inquiry because uncooperative witnesses may be imprisoned to compel their
testimony or severely penalized for perjury); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.2, at 608 (1984) (reasoning that, in practical effect,
the prosecutor exercises the grand jury's broad investigatory powers).
3. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (explaining that a federal
prosecutor has a "duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction" as well as "to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one"), overruled on other grounds by Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
4. See id. at 88 (noting that a United States Attorney must simultaneously assure
that guilt does not go unpunished and that the innocent do not suffer); cf. BENNETT L.
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT vii (release No. 11, Sept. 1996).
5. See GERSHMAN, supra note 4, § 6.1, at 6-2 (stating that a prosecutor has a duty
"to do justice," but must refrain from preventing a fair trial or manipulating the media for
personal gain).
6. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, § 1.01, at 1-4. Specifically, the Assize of Clarendon,
an early grand jury, was created in twelfth century England as an "investigative arm" of
the king. See Marvin G. Pickholz & Joyce Merrick Pickholz, Grand Jury Secrecy and the
Administrative Agency: Balancing Effective Prosecution of White Collar Crime Against
TraditionalSafeguards, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1029 (1979); see also FRANKEL &
NAFTALIS, supra note 1, at 6.
7. See Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 6, at 1029 (noting that the Assize "served by
leave of the Crown"); Peterson, supra note 1, at 245; cf. DIAMOND, supra note 1, § 1.01, at
104 (stating that the grand jury was originally created not to protect the public but to protect the power and authority of the king).
8. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 245. The English county sheriffs holding office in
Colonial America conducted "grande inquests" to investigate criminal activities. See
Lewis Poindexter Watts, Jr., Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog or Expensive Antique?, 37
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two important, albeit competing, functions. The grand jury advances
the prosecutorial needs of the government by assisting the government
in its investigation of individuals suspected of engaging in criminal activities. ' At the same time, the grand jury protects the private interests of
these suspected individuals or targets" by sheltering them from governmental pressure and adverse publicity whether they testify before, or are
investigated by, the grand jury.12
N.C. L. REV. 290, 293 (1959). These inquests invoked a presumption of guilt against the

target, thereby substantially reducing the chances of acquittal. See DIAMOND, supra note
1, § 1.01, at 1-4 (stating that grand jurors were severely fined for refusing to accuse a
"known" criminal; thus, an accusation by a grand jury was the equivalent of a finding of
guilt); Peterson, supra note 1, at 251 (noting that such inquests were tantamount to a presumption of guilt). The effect of this process was the crown's increased power over English society. See id.
9. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972) (explaining that grand juries
simultaneously determine whether sufficient evidence exists to indict while protecting the
accused from unsubstantiated criminal charges); see also United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d
1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that the grand jury is both an investigative mechanism
of the government and a protector of an individual's liberty interest); Peterson, supra
note 1, at 245 (same).
10. See 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 8.1, at 599-600 (noting that the grand
jury's investigatory powers assist the government in discovering new evidence vital to securing "convictions that might otherwise not be obtained").
11. This Note uses "targets," "targeted individuals," and "accused" to describe persons under investigation by a federal grand jury but not yet indicted. See In re Grand Jury
Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 n.9 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (defining a grand
jury target as someone about whom the prosecutor or the grand jury possesses substantial
evidence linking the suspect to a crime).
12. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (explaining that the grand jury
protects the target against unsubstantiated prosecution by determining whether a charge
is supported by reasonable evidence); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 554-55 (1884)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that grand juries provide protection against both governmental oppression and persons who attempt to use the process as a vehicle to satisfy personal vendettas); In re Jordan, 439 F. Supp. 199, 202 (S.D. W. Va. 1977) (stating that
grand jury secrecy protects the target prior to a criminal charge).
The Centennial Olympic Park bombing in July 1996 and the subsequent media blitz focusing on Richard Jewell highlight the type of harm an individual can suffer as a consequence of government error and misconduct. See Kevin Sack, U.S. Says F.B.I. Erred in
Using Deception in Olympic Bomb Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1997, at A17 (stating that
although the Department of Justice found "no intentional violation of Mr. Jewell's civil
rights and no criminal misconduct," it did conclude that agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) made "a major error in judgment" when interviewing Jewell without
reading him Miranda warnings during the Olympic Park bombing investigation); see also
L. Lin Wood, The Case of David v. Goliath: Jewell v. NBC and the Basics of Defamacast
in Georgia, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 691, 693 (1997) (quoting

Tom Brokaw of NBC News who stated that information concerning the FBI's focus on
Jewell was "coming to [NBC] from everywhere, Washington, Atlanta .... They are only
using one name tonight, and that is Richard Jewell"). Jewell "was not considered a target
of the bombing investigation[;J ... was never arrested; [and] he was never charged with
any crime." Wood, supra, at 691. Nevertheless, the FBI overzealously investigated
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Secrecy in grand jury proceedings is a critical component of the investigatory process. 3 Grand jury secrecy originally developed to facilitate
the government's criminal investigation and to protect the liberty interests of the grand jury target. 14 The secrecy component facilitates the
Jewell and utilized the media to attempt to pressure him into a guilty plea. Cf id. at 69293 (quoting Brokaw who stated publicly that the government leaked information concerning Jewell to the news media in order to "'sweat [the] guy"' by pressuring him publicly to force a confession or guilty plea). The government leaks led to defamatory statements by Brokaw, who announced "that the FBI is close to making the case, in their
language. They probably have enough to arrest him right now, probably enough to prosecute him, but you always want to have enough to convict him as well." Id. These statements "unquestionably injured [Jewell's] reputation, expos[ing] him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule, and imputed to him a crime [terrorism] punishable by death." Id. at

694.
13. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979) (explaining that secrecy is required for the grand jury to function properly); see also id. at 219
(noting that grand jury secrecy encourages potential witnesses to appear voluntarily and
testify fully and prevents the targets of investigations from fleeing); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958) (quoting the rationales for grand jury secrecy set forth in United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3rd Cir. 1954)); Lance v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202, 213 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that the grand
jury secrecy rule encourages the uninhibited investigation of suspected crimes).
14. Cf. In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 568-69 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (explaining that secrecy
evolved from a desire to insulate the grand jurors from royal pressures, to protect the target from royal tyranny, and to guard society against an oppressive government).
Secrecy and independence became an important part of British grand jury proceedings
after the 1681 trial of the Earl of Shaftesbury. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 252-53; Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 6, at 1029-30. During the grand jury's investigation of treason
charges against the Earl, it prohibited the royal prosecution's presence during witness testimony. See id. at 1029; see also LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER 9-12 (1975) (discussing the investigation of the Earl of
Shaftesbury); Peterson, supra note 1, at 252. The grand jury then refused to indict the
Earl, effectively asserting its independence from the royal power. See id.; Mike E. Stevenson, Comment, FederalGrandJury Secrecy, 5 GONz. L. REV. 255, 256 (1979) (indicating that the grand jury's actions while investigating the Earl significantly strengthened its
future independence from the crown). The key component establishing the grand jury's
new independence was its rule of secrecy. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 252-53.
The British colonists imported the grand jury investigatory process, with the elements
of secrecy and independence, to America. See 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, §
8.2(b), at 603 (indicating that the colonists adopted the grand jury into their criminal justice process); see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (asserting that by
incorporating the right to a grand jury into the United States Constitution, the drafters
intended that it operate similar to its English counterpart). Although the grand jury remains entrenched in the United States' justice system, England abolished the grand jury
in 1933. See FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 1, at 16; William J. Knudsen, Jr., Pretrial
Disclosureof Federal Grand Jury Testimony, 48 WASH. L. REV. 423, 423 n.3 (1973), reprinted in 60 F.R.D. 237, 237 n.3 (1974).
America's colonial experience under British rule heightened its distrust of a centralized
government. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 253 (explaining that British colonists imported
to America their fear of royal repression). This distrust, under British rule, acted to solidify the concept of grand jury secrecy in American criminal procedure. Cf. id. Through
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5
grand jury's ability to act simultaneously as a "sword" and as a "shield."'
As a "sword," grand jury secrecy aids the government in uncovering new
evidence, enabling the prosecution to obtain convictions that otherwise
might have been difficult to secure. 6 As a "shield," grand jury secrecy
protects the accused from unsubstantiated governmental prosecution,
and protects17witnesses and grand jurors from governmental pressure and

oppression.

The modern grand jury was memorialized in the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. In providing an accused the right to a
grand jury, the founding fathers implicitly acknowledged that secrecy
was a necessary component of that right." Maintaining secrecy decreases the possibility that a suspect may escape, destroy evidence, or
harass adverse witnesses. 0 Secrecy also protects the anonymity of the
secret proceedings, the colonial grand jury protected itself against governmental encroachment on its independence and authority. Cf.id. Armed with powers of secrecy and
independence, American colonial grand juries also protected the target of the investigation from governmental oppression. See id.; see also 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, §
8.2(b), at 603-04 (documenting a colonial grand jury's multiple refusals to grant an indictment against a citizen who was being harassed by royal officials).
15. See 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 8.1, at 599 (stating that the grand jury is
"commonly called 'the shield and the sword' of the criminal justice process"); In re Special Grand Jury January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671 (D. Md. 1970) (stating the grand jury
acts as "both a sword and a shield"); Cf.United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513
(1943) (noting that the tradition of secrecy is important for the "protection of the innocent" as well as for the "pursuit of the guilty").
16. See United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 304 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (stating that
the secrecy rule helps the government prosecute criminals); cf. 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 8.3, at 609-10 (noting that grand jury proceedings offer several distinct advantages in investigating crime, including securing the cooperation of victims who are reluctant to come forward).
17. See Smyth, 104 F. Supp. at 304 (stating that secrecy protects grand jurors from
"embarrassment, pressure, threats, and reprisals"); cf.1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2,
§ 8.1, at 599 (discussing the grand jury's role in protecting citizens from "'oppressive and
unfounded government prosecution"').
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423
(1983) (reasoning that the grand jury is so vital to criminal law and justice that it was embodied in the United States Constitution); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360
U.S. 395, 399 (1959) (same); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956) (stating
that early American colonists imported the grand jury procedure into this country and
memorialized it in the Constitution).
19. See Costello, 350 U.S. at 362 (noting that, in both England and the United States,
the grand jury long had acted in secret); see also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19 n.9 (1979) (noting that secrecy is considered essential to the
grand jury's operation); 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra, note 2, § 8.3, at 609 (noting that secrecy is among the five principal components of the grand jury process).
20. See Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219 & n.10 (explaining that secrecy is necessary to
prevent publicity of matters prompting targets to escape, tamper with evidence, or influence witnesses); PittsburghPlate Glass, 360 U.S. at 405 (same); United States v. Procter &

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 47:237

witness pool and encourages witnesses to appear before the grand jury to
speak without fear of public exposure.2' In addition, secrecy protects
grand jurors from injury caused by disclosure of grand jury discussions.22
Moreover, it prevents the premature disclosure of grand jury information that could prejudice the public against a target and interfere with a
defendant's right to a fair trial.2 ' Finally, grand jury secrecy prevents the
release of derogatory information about an unindicted individual.
In 1946, Congress codified the grand jury secrecy rule in Rule 6(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2 Rule 6(e) maintained the
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958) (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617,
628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)); United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524, 526 (D.R.I.
1917) (noting that a lack of secrecy in grand jury proceedings may cause accused individuals to flee or to tamper with witnesses or evidence).
21. See Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219 (stating that grand jury witnesses would be dissuaded from testifying "fully and frankly" if preindictment proceedings were not conducted in secret because of the risk of retaliation or inducement); Pittsburgh Plate Glass,
360 U.S. at 405 (explaining that secrecy encourages grand jury witnesses to testify freely
without fear of harmful consequences); Providence Tribune, 241 F. at 526 (same); see also
Richard M. Calkins, GrandJury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, 459 (1965) (stating that
"[s]ecrecy is the state's inducement for obtaining evidence" because it encourages witnesses to come forth and disclose information).
22. See Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219 n.10 (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d
617, 628-29 (3rd Cir. 1954)) (stating that secrecy encourages grand jurors to conduct their
investigation freely without fear of retaliation); Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 360 U.S. at 405
(explaining that secrecy allows grand jurors to conduct investigations without fear that
their deliberations will be disclosed); see also Peterson, supra note 1, at 255 (stating that
publicizing grand jury proceedings is prohibited to protect against future injury arising
from the public's receipt of this information).
23. See Providence Tribune, 241 F. at 526 (stating that premature disclosure of grand
jury information may turn the public's mind against a target and, consequently, prevent a
fair trial); In re United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 866 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) (noting that secrecy during grand jury proceedings lessens the risk of prejudice at
trial); Knudsen, supra note 14, at 241-42 (noting that grand jury secrecy protects the rights
of the accused). Once the grand jury issues an indictment, however, the secrecy requirement no longer exists "as a safeguard for the accused." United States v. Smyth, 104 F.
Supp. 283, 304 n.92 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
24. See Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 219 & n.10 (explaining that grand jury secrecy is required to protect the reputations of the innocent by preventing public condemnation of
persons who are wrongly accused); Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 360 U.S. at 405 (noting that
grand jury secrecy protects an unindicted person from disclosure of negative information); United States v. Coughlan, 842 F.2d 737, 739 (4th Cir. 1988) (asserting that the
grand jury secrecy rule prevents unindicted targets from damaging publicity); Lance v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202, 213 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that the secrecy
rule prevents harm to the reputations of unindicted targets); Providence Tribune, 241 F. at
526 (stating that secrecy in grand jury proceedings shields innocent individuals from possible harm to their reputations).
25. The present version of Rule 6(e) states in relevant part:
(1) Recording of Proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand jury is
deliberating or voting, shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording device. An unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or
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common law requirement that grand jury proceedings remain secret.26
As originally enacted, Rule 6(e) did not contain a statutory remedy for
violations of the grand jury secrecy rule. 2' However, federal district
courts, invoking their inherent 28 and statutory 29 powers, regularly used
any portion of a proceeding shall not affect the validity of the prosecution. The
recording or reporter's notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall remain
in the custody or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise
ordered by the court in a particular case.
(2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an
operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an
attorney for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this
rule. A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1)-(2).
The Supreme Court upheld the need for secrecy in grand jury proceedings even prior to
the codification of Rule 6(e). See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943). In
Johnson, the Court concluded that the grand jury requirement is an integral part of the
Constitution, and that compromising the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings would interfere with its ability to function properly. See id.
26. See Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1988) (Tjoflat &
Roettger, JJ., specially concurring) (stating that Congress preserved the common law
grand jury secrecy rule when it enacted Rule 6(e)); George H. Dession, The New Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure:H, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 203 (1947) (noting that Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 6(e) basically codified the traditional policy of grand jury secrecy).
27. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 260. The text of the original Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 6(e) provided:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government
for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury
only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant
upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment
because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy
may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. The court
may direct that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal the indictment and
no person shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when necessary for
the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1946) (amended 1977).
28. See United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that a federal district court inherently possesses the power to "impose order, respect, decorum, silence, and compliance with lawful mandates"); Richard B. Kuhns, Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Roles for the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury, 73
MICH. L. REV. 484, 496 (1975) (noting that the judiciary has the inherent authority to
compel compliance with court orders and the power to guard against disorder in the
courtroom). But cf. LaGrange v. State, 153 N.E.2d 593, 595 (Ind. 1958) (noting that the
legislature may regulate the Indiana court's inherent supervisory powers).
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994) (providing federal courts with the power to punish
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contempt 3° to sanction violations of Rule 6(e).31 Congress subsequently
added an express contempt remedy to Rule 6(e), providing that "[a]
32
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.,
Courts have struggled to determine the scope of Rule 6(e)'s contempt
remedy. 3 Several federal circuit courts have implicitly or explicitly addressed the issue of whether the contempt remedy includes civil and
criminal contempt sanctions and equitable relief, as well as whether a
private right of action is contemplated to pursue such relief.34 Courts
contempt for official misconduct). Section 401 provides federal courts with the statutory
authority to impose contempt sanctions for obstruction of justice, misbehavior of officers
of the court or disobedience of a lawful order or decree. See id.
30. See infra note 74 (discussing the scope and role of the court's contempt powers in
the judicial process).
. 31. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 281 (noting that prior to 1977, courts generally
viewed contempt as the proper remedy for Rule 6(e) violations).
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text (quoting
the current grand jury secrecy rule).
33. See infra Part I.B. At least one district court has held that the contempt remedy
under Rule 6(e) contemplates only criminal contempt sanctions. See In re Grand Jury
Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1202 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that Rule 6(e)
authorizes only criminal contempt sanctions, not civil contempt sanctions, equitable relief,
or a private right of action for such relief). In addition, three federal circuit judges, writing separately, have argued that Rule 6(e) excludes any form of a civil remedy. See Barry
v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy is criminal, not civil); Blalock v. United States, 844
F.2d 1546, 1552-53 (11th Cir. 1988) (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring) (arguing that neither civil contempt sanctions, equitable relief, nor a private right of action for
such relief is available under Rule 6(e)).
Yet other courts have held that Rule 6(e) allows criminal and civil contempt sanctions,
including equitable relief, but does not contemplate a private cause of action for such relief. See Finn v. Schiller, 72 F.3d 1182, 1188 (4th Cir. 1996). Other courts have held that
Rule 6(e) contemplates both criminal and civil sanctions, equitable relief, and a private
right of action for such relief enforceable by civil contempt. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 132122; Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1551.
34. See, e.g., Finn, 72 F.3d at 1188 (holding that Rule 6(e) allows for civil and criminal contempt remedies and equitable relief, but does not provide a private right of action); Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321-22 (interpreting Rule 6(e) to include criminal and civil contempt sanctions, as well as a private right of action); Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1551 (same);
Lance v. United States Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202, 220 (5th Cir. 1980) (contemplating
civil and criminal contempt sanctions, as well as injunctive relief for violations of Rule
6(e)).
Injunctive relief is a form of equitable relief, but equitable relief is broader, consisting
not only of injunctions, but of specific performance, rescission, and declaratory judgments. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITYRESTITUTION § 2.1(2), at 59-61 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES].
Equitable relief also encompasses "sanctions," which are defined as "mechanism[s] of
enforcement used to provide incentives for obedience with the law or with rules and
regulations." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1341 (6th ed. 1990); cf Finn, 72 F.3d at 1191
(concluding that civil and criminal contempt sanctions may be necessary to remedy a Rule
6(e) violation, and that "sanctions" in the form of injunctive relief also may be required to
prevent further wrongful disclosures). Courts have used "sanctions" and injunctive relief
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generally recognize that the contempt remedy under the Rule contem-

plates criminal contempt to punish past violations and civil contempt to
compel future compliance." Two circuits have ruled that upon a prima
ther wrongful disclosures). Courts have used "sanctions" and injunctive relief interchangeably. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1324 & n.7 (stating that "civil contempt sanction[s]
may include appropriate equitable relief"); see also infra note 74 (discussing the nature
and scope of contempt sanctions).
Equitable relief in the form of an injunction is defined as "an in personam order, directing the defendant to act, or to refrain from acting in a specified way." DAN B.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §
2.10, at 105 (1973) [hereinafter DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES]. An injunction is enforceable through the use of the court's contempt power. See 1 DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES, supra, § 1.1, at 7; see also supra notes 28-29 (discussing the inherent and statutory bases for the court's contempt powers); infra note 72 (discussing the nature and
scope of the court's contempt powers). There are several different classifications of injunctions. See 1 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra, § 2.9(1), at 224-26. Injunctions can
be classified as prohibitory (forbidding a defendant to act in a certain way) or mandatory
(commanding a defendant to act in a certain way). See id. § 2.9(a), at 224. Injunctions
may also be classified as "reparative" and "preventive." Id. § 2.9(1), at 225. A court issues a reparative injunction to safeguard a plaintiff's right. See id. Preventive injunctions
are ordered to block future violations of a right. See id. A court can use many kinds of
injunctions "to prevent [a] violation of rights or to restore the plaintiff to rights that have
already been violated." Id. § 2.9(2), at 227. Because injunctive relief is not limited "to
any particular kind of case or constellation of facts," such relief provides courts with a
powerful mechanism to do equity in a broad range of circumstances. Id.
The grant or denial of injunctive relief is within the court's discretion. See DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES, supra, § 2.10, at 110-11. A court may deny an injunction if a
plaintiff does not establish an underlying right. See 1 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra,
§ 2.9(2), at 227. In addition, unless there is some threat that the right will be violated in
the future, the court need not enjoin the previously violative behavior. See id. § 2.4(7), at
120. Furthermore, if a legal remedy adequately redresses the harm, a court may deny a
request for injunctive relief. See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES, supra, § 3.6, at 57;
id. § 2.10, at 108. In other words, under the adequacy test, the court must determine
whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief or whether
further harm to the plaintiff is otherwise likely. See 1 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra,
§ 2.9(2), at 228. In addition to the adequacy or irreparable harm test, the court may consider "the equities, or hardships or practicalities" of granting the injunctive relief. Id. If
the result weighs in favor of the plaintiff, the court may grant the injunctive remedy, but if
it does not, the court may deny injunctive relief. See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES,
supra, § 2.10, at 108; see also 1 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra, § 2.9(2), at 228-30 (discussing additional bases for granting or denying injunctive relief).
A court may invoke the injunctive remedy under its equitable powers or a statute may
expressly or impliedly provide for such a remedy. See 1 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, supra, § 2.10, at 243. If the statute expressly authorizes injunctive relief, courts generally do
not apply the adequacy test, irreparable harm rule, or balance the equities or hardships.
See id. § 2.10, at 243-44. However, if the statute can be construed to authorize an injunction, but does not explicitly provide for such a remedy, the traditional tests governing
whether the court should grant injunctive relief can be applied. See id. § 2.10, at 246-47.
35. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1188; Barry, 865 F.2d at 1323-24. But see In re Grand Jury
Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. at 1202-03 (stating that the grand jury secrecy rule
authorizes criminal contempt sanctions for secrecy violations, but not civil contempt sanctions or injunctive relief).
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facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation, a grand jury target has the right to
36
an evidentiary hearing to establish appropriate relief for the violation.
Two circuit courts have held that a target has a private right of action37 to
seek injunctive relief and contempt sanctions, but that civil contempt
standing alone does not form an independent basis for that action; instead, courts use civil contempt sanctions to insure compliance with equitable orders issued in response to a Rule 6(e) violation.38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Finn v.
Schiller39 most recently addressed the scope of the contempt remedy under Rule 6(e). In Finn, the target of a grand jury investigation filed a
private civil action seeking injunctive relief against a prosecutor for alleged violations of Rule 6(e).40 The Fourth Circuit ruled that a target has
the right to notify the court of alleged Rule 6(e) violations, and that a
court has an affirmative duty to investigate charges once a prima facie
showing of a violation is made. In addition, the court has a duty to provide the relief necessary to prevent future violations (injunctive relief
and/or civil contempt) and/or to punish past violations (criminal contempt). 41 Contrary to prior federal circuit court rulings, however, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that a target did not have a private right of action to pursue such relief against an alleged violator under the Rule.42
36. See United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 964 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that if
the petitioner establishes a prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation, a court is required to "take steps to stop" further violations following an evidentiary hearing); Lance
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202, 213, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1980) (indicating that
once the petitioner establishes a prima facie case of a Rule 6(e) violation, the court must
grant a hearing to determine whether contempt sanctions are necessary).
37. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321-22; Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1551. A private right of action is defined as a right to bring suit for "remedy and relief through judicial procedure."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 1325.
38. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321-22; Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1551.
39. 72 F.3d 1182 (4th Cir. 1996).
40. See id. at 1185.
41. See id. at 1188.
42. See id. at 1187; see also infra Part II (discussing the Fourth Circuit's analysis of
the scope of relief available under Rule 6(e)). The Fourth Circuit in Finn indicated that
such relief may be in the form of civil contempt sanctions or remedial injunctions to stop
further violations of the Rule, or in the form of criminal contempt sanctions to punish
prior wrongful behavior. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1188. Contempt sanctions usually take the
form of fines or imprisonment to coerce or punish a contemnor for violating a court order
or decree or for violating a rule or statute. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the scope and nature of civil and criminal contempt sanctions, as well as the purposes for which such sanctions are imposed). Furthermore, civil contempt sanctions may
encompass equitable relief such as injunctions or other coercive remedies. See Barry, 865
F.2d at 1324 n.7. Injunctive relief is an actual order by the court directing a person to do
or refrain from doing a particular act, or to prohibit him from ever doing a particular act
again. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the nature and scope of equi-
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This Note will examine the availability of civil remedies, including a
private cause of action for equitable relief, to individuals harmed by
violations of grand jury secrecy as codified in Rule 6(e). This Note first
examines the legislative history of Rule 6(e), discussing the nature and
scope of the contempt remedy available under the Rule. This Note next
focuses on the parameters of the Rule 6(e) remedy as established by the
federal circuit courts in Lance, Eisenberg, Blalock, and Barry. This Note
then explores the impact of the Finn decision on the scope of the Rule
6(e) contempt remedy. This Note recognizes that the alternative remedial procedure outlined by the Finn court arguably provides a viable
means of pursuing relief against Rule 6(e) violators. This Note argues,
however, that broadly construing Rule 6(e) to create a private cause of
action for equitable relief allows a grand jury target greater choice in
pursuing relief and gives federal courts more flexibility in fashioning
remedies consistent with the courts' inherent supervisory powers and
with the philosophy and history underlying the grand jury secrecy rule.
This Note concludes that Congress intended to provide a private right of
action to seek injunctive relief and contempt sanctions under the Rule,
and a grand jury target should not be deprived of that right. Indeed, in
the absence of such a right, a grand jury target is limited in his ability to
obtain judicial review of prosecutorial misconduct.43
I. THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK OF THE GRAND JURY
SECRECY RULE

A. FederalRule of CriminalProcedure6(e): Codificationof the
Common Law Rule of GrandJury Secrecy
Congress codified the grand jury secrecy rule in Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 44 in 1946 to ensure the continued existable relief, including injunctive orders).
43. See Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1207-08 (1st Cir. 1996). In 1988, Congress passed the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act. See
id. at 1207. This Act, also known as the "Westfall Act," is the exclusive remedy available
to private parties who want to bring an action for money damages if they were injured
due to the "'negligent or wrongful act or omission' of a federal employee 'acting within
the scope of his office or employment."' See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1994)).
In other words, federal employees who commit libel, slander, and other common law torts
but who act within the scope of their federal employment are immune from private tort
liability. See id.; cf. GERSHMAN, supra note 4, § 6.4(d), at 6-14 (stating that criminal contempt is rarely invoked to punish prosecutorial misconduct because it is hard to prove in
highly publicized cases).
44. See United States v. Coughlan, 842 F.2d 737, 739 (4th Cir. 1988); see also John M.
Walker, Jr., United States v. Sells: Engineering A Result To Promote Grand Jury Secrecy,
21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 105-06 (1983). The Supreme Court appointed an Advisory
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tence of the common law guarantee of grand jury secrecy.45 Codification
of the common law rule formalized the prohibition against the improper
use of grand jury materials,46 but limited the scope of the secrecy protection by providing for limited disclosure of grand jury materials and upholding the secrecy obligation only when the procedures employed complied with the Rule's provisions.47 In the 1970s, courts became concerned
with the 1946 version of Rule 6(e), stating that it was lacking in two respects. 48 First, the Rule prohibited non-attorneys who were assisting the

government in its criminal investigation from accessing grand jury materials.49 Second, it failed to articulate a remedy for violations of grand jury
secrecy. ° Despite Rule 6(e)'s limit on non-attorney access to grand jury
Committee in 1941 to draft the original Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See George
H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1, 55 YALE L.J. 694, 695
(1946). The Supreme Court approved the draft rules in 1944 and submitted them to Congress. See id. at 696. The rules were published in 1946. See id. at 697.
45. See Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1555 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 n.9 (1979)) (indicating that
grand jury secrecy was mandatory under the federal common law and is an important
component of America's system of criminal justice).
46. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 260 (explaining that the 1946 version incorporated
the common law secrecy rule).
47. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1946); see also Peterson, supra
note 1, at 260 (noting that Rule 6(e) provided for limited disclosure and that the secrecy
obligation could be invoked only pursuant to the Rule).
48. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 260 (discussing the deficiencies of the original Rule
6(e)); see also infra note 52 (discussing several cases which outline the problematic nature
of the 1946 version of Rule 6(e)).
49. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 260. The original Rule restricted grand jury materials to government attorneys "for use in the performance of their duties." FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 821, 837 (1946) (amended 1977). Despite this prohibition, non-attorneys
(for example, specialists and experts) continued to access secret grand jury materials. See
United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 436 (1983) (stating that disclosure of
grand jury materials to non-attorneys was common under the original form of Rule 6(e)).
50. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 260; see also supra note 27 (providing the text of
the original Rule 6(e) which did not provide for a remedy). In the absence of a statutory
penalty, federal courts invoked their inherent powers to enforce Rule 6(e) secrecy obligations. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 281.
Instead of acting as a "shield" to protect targets from unlawful disclosures of grand jury
materials, the 1946 version acted more like a "sword," often insulating the actions of government attorneys from judicial scrutiny. See id. Early cases indicate, however, that federal courts were sensitive to the "shield" aspect of the common law secrecy rule and were
willing to impose sanctions on persons other than prosecutors who were subject to the
rule. See id.; see also Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 396 (6th Cir. 1940) (holding
attorneys for grand jury targets guilty of criminal contempt for obstruction of justice);
Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1939) (imposing a 30-day determinate sentence on a grand jury witness who refused to take the oath of secrecy);
United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524, 528 (D.R.I. 1917) (holding a newspaper in contempt for violating the common law grand jury secrecy rule in connection
with a grand jury investigation); In re Summerhayes, 70 F. 769, 773-75 (N.D. Cal. 1895)
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materials, complex litigation forced government attorneys to consult
specialists who subsequently obtained access to grand jury materials."
The increased access these specialists had to secret grand jury materials,
coupled with the absence of a specific remedy for violations of the Rule,
led to concern that the traditional rule of grand jury secrecy and the protection it afforded individuals and society would disappear. 2
(holding a grand juror in contempt of court for a breach of secrecy based on the court's
statutory authority to prevent obstruction of justice).
51. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 260; Walker, supra note 44, at 106.
52. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 261-63 (discussing several cases that were instrumental in sparking congressional scrutiny of the accessibility of secret grand jury materials, including Simplot Co. v. United States, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9146, at 86,195
(9th Cir. 1976); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098
(E.D. Pa. 1976); and In re William H. Pflaumer & Sons, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa.
1971)).
In Pflaumer, the petitioner submitted materials to the grand jury in response to a subpoena, but sought a protective order to prevent the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from
gaining access to these materials. See Pflaumer, 53 F.R.D. at 467. The district court denied petitioner's motion. See id. at 468. Although the prosecutor had disclosed the
documents to the IRS, the court reasoned that if the materials "remain under the aegis of
attorneys for the government," a protective order was not necessary. Id. at 477.
Similarly, in Hawthorne, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the continuation of the grand jury
proceedings, or in the alternative, to prevent the IRS's use of subpoenaed documents, allegedly obtained through a breach of grand jury secrecy. See Hawthorne, 406 F. Supp. at
1103. The plaintiff argued that the government violated Rule 6(e) by disclosing the subpoenaed materials to the IRS. See id. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the IRS
agents were not sworn to secrecy, were not informed that the materials were required to
remain under the "aegis" of the prosecutor, and did not otherwise advise the relevant
persons of their obligations under Rule 6(e). See id. at 1103 n.3.
Although the Hawthornecourt denied plaintiff's request for relief, it expressed concern
at the government's lack of compliance with Rule 6(e)and advised the government to implement certain procedures to ensure future compliance with the Rule. See id. at 1104.
The court first suggested that persons assisting the government should be required to
swear to secrecy and should receive written instructions clarifying the restricted use of the
materials. See id. at 1125-26. The court also proposed that grand jury materials should be
marked and segregated from other government agency files. See id. at 1126. The court
then suggested that a government agency should demonstrate that the specialized assistant was necessary before that individual could obtain access to the secret materials. See
id. at 1126-27. Further, the court proposed that the prosecutor maintain a detailed docket
to keep track of any agency personnel with access to grand jury materials. See id. at 1127.
The Hawthorne court submitted these suggestions for consideration to the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See id.
at 1126 n.54.
Like Hawthorne, the petitioner in Simplot protested the IRS's use of confidential grand
jury materials. See 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 86,196. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that a government agency's access to grand jury materials is substantively different from a
federal prosecutor's access to such information and must be restricted. See id. at 86,197.
The court explained that the Constitution provides the right to a grand jury. See id. The
grand jury acts under the supervision of the courts and not as an instrument for the multifarious purposes of the government. See id. In addition, the court endorsed the procedures suggested by the Hawthorne court, and also suggested that in subsequent cases, the
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In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee attempted to reconcile the need for grand jury secrecy with the government's need for the assistance of non-attorneys by expanding the list of
persons authorized to access grand jury materials." The House Judiciary
Committee disapproved of the Advisory Committee's proposal, voicing
concern that allowing such broad access to these
materials would un14
dermine the grand jury secrecy requirement. In response, the Senate
Judiciary Committee redrafted the initial proposal, balancing the risk of
broad access with an express contempt penalty for violations of Rule

IRS should be required to establish the source of its information and to prove that this
source was independent from the grand jury process. See id. at 86,199 & n.17.
53. See Walker, supra note 44, at 107 (discussing the Advisory Committee's proposed 1977 amendment to Rule 6(e)). The Advisory Committee's proposed amendment
provided:
6(e) SECRECY OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISCLOSURE. Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance
of their duties. For purposes of this subdivision, "attorneys for the government"
includes those enumerated in rule 54(c); it also includes such other government
personnel as are necessary to assist the attorneys for the government in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer,
operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony
may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by
the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when
permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that
grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon
any person except in accordance with this rule. The federal magistrate to whom
an indictment is returned may direct that it shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial. Thereupon the clerk shall
seal the indictment and no person shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
8 JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 6.01[61[b] (2d ed., Release 53, Aug. 1993).
The Advisory Committee's proposed amendment expanded the definition of "attorneys
for the government" to include the Attorney General, a United States Attorney, and any
authorized assistants to such offices. See Walker, supra note 44, at 106. The Advisory
Committee also broadened the scope of "other government personnel" to include "employees of administrative agencies and government departments." See H.R. DOC. NO.
94-464, at 8 (1976) (indicating that the purpose of the amendment was to allow experts
and consultants of government attorneys to access grand jury materials); see also S. REP.
No. 95-354, at 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 529; H.R. REP. No. 95-195,
at 3, 4 (1977). The 1977 amendment, as originally proposed, did not provide a remedy for
secrecy rule violations. See Peterson, supra, note 1, at 263.
54. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-195, at 4. The House Judiciary Committee criticized the
proposed changes to Rule 6(e), arguing that the amendment would provide the government with access to secret grand jury materials which could then be exploited in unrelated
civil or criminal cases. See id. In this fashion, the government could avoid laws that otherwise prevented access to this information. See id.
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6(e). 5 The amended Rule 6(e) became effective on October 1, 197756
and both broadened access to grand jury materials and added a contempt remedy. 7 The amendment, however, failed to explicitly define the
scope of the contempt remedy. 8
B. Contempt and Grand Jury Secrecy: The 1977 Amendment and Beyond
The 1977 amendment expressly provided for a contempt of court remedy to punish violations of the grand jury secrecy rule.59 Some courts
55. See S. REP. No. 95-354, at 1-2, 5-8, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 528-32.
Senate Report 95-354 stated:
The Rule as redrafted is designed to accommodate the belief on the one hand
that Federal prosecutors should be able, without the time-consuming requirement of prior judicial interposition, to make such disclosures of grand jury information to other government personnel as they deem necessary to facilitate
the performance of their duties relating to criminal law enforcement. On the
other hand, the Rule seeks to allay the concerns of those who fear that such
prosecutorial power will lead to misuse of the grand jury to enforce non-criminal
Federal laws by (1) providing a clear prohibition, subject to the penalty of contempt and (2) requiring that a court order under paragraph (C) be obtained to
authorize such a disclosure.
Id. at 8.
56. See Act of July 30,1977, Pub. L. No. 95-78, § 4, 91 Stat. 319, 322.
57. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 265.
58. See id. Congress neglected to indicate whether the newly created contempt remedy was criminal or civil and whether it contemplated a private right of action. See id.
59. See id. The 1977 amendment added a provision at the end of the rule stating that
"[a] knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court." FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6(e)(2); see also infra note 74 (discussing the nature and scope of a court's contempt
remedy).
Although the Rule expressly provides a contempt remedy to punish secrecy violations,
courts also have ordered injunctive relief to remedy violations of the Rule in appropriate
circumstances. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 286-87 (stating that most courts do not view
contempt as the sole remedy for Rule 6(e) violations); see also supra note 34 (discussing
the nature and scope of equitable relief, including injunctive orders). In United States v.
Coughlan, the government initiated a civil forfeiture proceeding against a former grand
jury witness and introduced a portion of his grand jury testimony into the record. 842
F.2d 737, 739 (4th Cir. 1988). The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the grand jury material in the civil suit. See id. The government admitted to violating Rule 6(e) because it disclosed grand jury materials, but argued that contempt was
the sole remedy under the Rule. See id. The court disagreed, holding that contempt was
not the exclusive remedy because Rule 6(e) states only that the court "may" punish violations as contempt. See id. at 740. The court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to consider contempt sanctions or other forms of relief, as it deemed appropriate. See id.; see also In re Charlotte Observer, 921 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that
"in appropriate circumstances" a court might issue an injunction to protect grand jury secrecy).
For other cases in which federal courts have held that injunctive relief may be an appropriate remedy for Rule 6(e) violations, see Advance Publicationsv. United States, 805
F.2d 155, 169 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that a court may enjoin the government from dis-
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and circuit court judges interpret the contempt remedy under Rule 6(e)
as encompassing only criminal contempt.") Others construe the contempt remedy as including both civil and criminal contempt, as well as
injunctive relief enforceable by civil contempt. 61 Still other courts recognize not only criminal and civil contempt remedies and injunctive relief,
but also that Rule
6(e) forms a basis for a private right of action to pur62
sue such relief.
The confusion in interpreting the contempt remedy under the Rule derives from its language. 63 The Rule does not explicitly delineate the
scope and extent of the remedy. 64 Moreover, the legislative history of the
1977 amendment does not clarify Congress's intent.65 Four federal circlosing grand jury materials once a target has established a prima facie case of a Rule 6(e)
violation); In re Special March 1981 Grand Jury, 753 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1985) (reasoning that a court may grant injunctive orders to prohibit the use of wrongfully disclosed
grand jury information); United States v. DiBona, 601 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (E.D. Pa. 1.984)
(enjoining the government under Rule 6(e) from its continued use of confidential grand
jury material).
60. See supra note 33 (discussing judicial support for the proposition that criminal
contempt is the exclusive Rule 6(e) remedy); see also infra this Part (discussing the scope
of the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy as established in case law).
61. See Finn v. Schiller, 72 F.3d 1182, 1188 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that, in addition to
criminal and civil contempt, an injunctive order may be necessary to "stop further or future release of grand jury material"); see also supra notes 32-34 (citing those courts that
have found both civil and criminal contempt within the Rule 6(e) remedy); supra note 34
(noting that a court has inherent power to prevent harm or to restore rights that were
previously violated by invoking its equitable powers in the form of injunctive relief); supra note 59 (indicating that courts have used injunctive relief to remedy Rule 6(e) violations); infra this Part (discussing the courts' justifications and rationales for adopting
varying interpretations of the courts' contempt power under Rule 6(e)).
62. See supra note 33 (citing those courts that have found the broadest Rule 6(e)
remedy); see also infra this Part (discussing the courts' justifications and rationales for
finding civil and criminal contempt remedies a private cause of action).
63.. Cf. Peterson, supra note 1, at 265 (noting that the Rule does not specify whether
criminal or civil contempt should be used to punish violations of the Rule).
64. See supra note 25 (quoting the text of current Rule 6(e)). The Rule provides that
a violation "may be punished as a contempt of court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
65. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 313 ("If Congress had intended to curtail or limit
the judiciary's use of contempt while striking a balance between government agency access to grand jury materials and grand jury secrecy, the legislative history would presumably have been more clear."). The legislative history indicates that Congress was sensitive to the rights of persons who may be adversely affected by the improper use or
disclosure of grand jury information. See S. REP. No. 95-354, at 8 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 531-32; see also supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (explaining that the Rule 6(e) amendment as initially proposed broadened access to grand
jury materials but failed to provide penalties to regulate such access so as to protect the
secrecy requirement). The Senate Judiciary Committee redrafted the proposed amendment, increasing access to grand jury materials as well as providing a penalty provision to
regulate such access. See S. REP. No. 95-354, at 8; see also supra notes 54-55 (noting the
concerns and the rationale for providing a penalty).
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cuit courts have addressed the scope of the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy,
and, specifically, whether a grand jury target may request civil and crimihas
nal contempt sanctions and injunctive relief, and whether a target
6
1
violator.
the
against
suit
private
a
in
relief
such
pursue
to
standing
1. Lance v. United States Department of Justice: A Precursorto a
PrivateRight of Action
The Fifth Circuit in Lance v. United States Department of Justice61 was
the first federal circuit court to acknowledge implicitly a target's private
right of action" when it allowed him to petition a district court for an
evidentiary hearing alleging wrongful disclosure of grand jury matters. 69
The court concluded that upon a prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e)
violation,7 ° a district court could require a person who wrongfully disclosed such matters to show cause why he should not be held in civil contempt and sanctioned." In Lance, a federal grand jury began investigating certain activities of T. Bertram Lance, a close friend of President
Carter and a former Director of the Budget.72 After several attempts to
enjoin the extrajudicial publicity by the government's attorneys,73 Lance
66. See infra Parts I.B.1-4, II (discussing the Lance, Eisenberg, Blalock, Barry, and
Finn decisions).
67. 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980).
68. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 290.
69. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 220-21; see also Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546,
1551 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Lance stands for the proposition that a target may bring suit for
injunctive relief against the individuals subject to Rule 6(e)(2) and may invoke the district
court's contempt power to coerce compliance with any injunctive order the court
grants.").
70. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing the main elements of the
Lance prima facie test).
71. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 220-21. As previously noted, a civil contempt sanction
may include injunctive relief. See Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1324 n.7 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); see also supra note 34 (discussing the nature and scope of equitable relief,
which includes injunctions and sanctions).
72. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 207. The investigation attracted significant local and national media attention. See id. Several major newspapers published reports concerning
the grand jury's investigation of Lance's activities. See id. at 207 & n.1, 209 n.2, 211 n.3.
73. See id. at 207-11. Lance moved for equitable relief, requesting that the court
prohibit anyone, including the government's attorneys, from disclosing information obtained during the grand jury inquiry. See id. at 207. Although the court granted Lance's
motion, the extrajudicial publicity continued. See id. at 208-09. Instead of filing another
motion, Lance responded to the publicity by writing a letter to the court expressing his
concern regarding the continuing disclosures. See id. at 209. The court did not issue a
new order, but reiterated that the protections afforded by Rule 6(e) would be enforced.
See id. at 210. The violations allegedly continued, however, and Lance moved for contempt sanctions to compel compliance with the Rule in accordance with the court's previous orders. See id. at 211.
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filed a motion for contempt sanctions,74 alleging that the government's
disclosures violated Rule 6(e). 7' Among other things, Lance requested
that the court order all government attorneys involved in the investigation to show cause why the court should not impose contempt sanctions
for prior wrongful disclosures of grand jury materials.76 Lance also asked
the court to impose any additional sanctions that would remedy a Rule
74. See id. at 207. A court uses its contempt power to vindicate the authority of the
court and/or to vindicate the rights of a person pursuant to in personam orders such as
injunctions. See 1 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES supra note 34, § 2.8(1), at 186-87. A
court's contempt power allows it to impose both civil and criminal sanctions. See id.
§ 2.8(1), at 187. A court may impose civil contempt sanctions to coerce a contemnor to
comply with an injunctive order. See id. § 2.8(1), at 186. Civil contempt benefits the party
whose rights and remedies were adversely affected by the contemnor. See Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911) (explaining that a civil contempt
remedy is imposed to benefit the petitioner by forcing a contemnor's compliance). Courts
may use fines, imprisonment, or both to compel compliance. See I DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES, supra note 34, § 2.8(1), at 186-87. However, when issuing a civil contempt
sanction, a court is not limited in the types of sanctions that it may impose for criminal
contempt of court. See id.; see also Barry, 865 F.2d at 1324 n.7 ("[A] civil contempt sanction may include appropriate equitable relief.").
A court may impose a criminal contempt sanction for the same conduct that might trigger a civil contempt sanction, however, the court's purpose in ordering criminal sanctions
is to vindicate the court's authority and is punitive, rather than coercive. See Gompers,
221 U.S. at 441-42; Finn v. Schiller, 72 F.3d 1182, 1188 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that a court
may issue criminal and civil contempt sanctions for past violations of a rule of law, such as
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)).
Discerning between civil and criminal contempt is often difficult. See James W. Fox,
Jr., The Road Not Taken: Criminal Contempt Sanctions and Grand Jury Press Leaks, 25
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 505, 514 (1992); Joseph Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Civil
and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 780, 781 (1943) (noting the confusion in delineating
between criminal and civil contempt). Certain conduct has elements of both civil contempt and criminal contempt. See Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441-42 (recognizing that civil and
criminal contempt have aspects that are remedial, punitive, or both). When a court imposes either remedial or punitive sanctions on a contemnor, it may be vindicating its
authority and coercing compliance. See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 635
(1988).
Constitutional safeguards attach to criminal contempt proceedings. See Gompers, 221
U.S. at 444 (stating that constitutional protections apply in proceedings for criminal contempt). If a sentence of imprisonment greater than six months is imposed, the criminal
contemnor has a right to a jury trial. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 516-17
(1974).
Civil contempt proceedings do not invoke the substantial rights and constitutional
privileges involved in criminal contempt proceedings. See 1 DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES,
supra note 34, § 2.8(1), at 187. If a court imposes a non-determinate sentence on a contemnor to compel compliance with a previous in personam order, the contemnor's liberty
interests are not jeopardized. Cf. id. The civil contemnor may be released if he agrees to
comply with the court's order. See In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902) (noting
that civil contemnors "carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets").
75. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 211.
76. See id.
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6(e) violation, including an order dismissing the grand jury and
77
•
• • barring
the future prosecution of Lance in connection with the investigation.
The district court denied Lance's motion, ruling that he had not presented enough evidence of wrongdoing to7 8warrant an evidentiary hearing on the charges against the government.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit articulated the factors necessary to establish a prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation warranting an evidentiary hearing. 79 First, the unauthorized disclosures must clearly reveal information concerning "'matters occurring before the grand jury,"' which
were wrongfully disclosed by "'an attorney for the Government.' ' 0 Second, the content or circumstances of the disclosed material must indicate
that it was derived from grand jury information protected from disclosure by Rule 6(e). 8' Third, the court will presume that the publicized disclosures are true.82 Fourth, the court must analyze the scope of the relief
sought and the extent to which such relief, if granted, would hinder the
grand jury's investigation.8 ' Finally, the court must evaluate whether the
77. See id. Although fines and imprisonment are the most common types of contempt sanctions used by courts, there are "no specific limits placed on the kind of sanction
available for contempt." DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES, supra note 34, § 2.9(1), at
101. Thus, a court has the discretion to issue a contempt sanction in forms that resemble
injunctive orders, such as the form of relief requested by Lance. See id. § 2.8(1), at 186;
see also Barry, 865 F.2d at 1324 n.7 ("[A] civil contempt sanction may include appropriate
equitable relief."). The Lance court concluded that Rule 6(e) authorized contempt sanctions to compel compliance with Rule 6(e) prohibitions. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 220; see
also Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that the Fifth
Circuit in Lance held that a target "may seek civil contempt sanctions for a violation of
Rule 6(e)(2)"); infra notes 93-109 and accompanying text. (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Eisenberg and the limits of civil relief available upon a
prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation).
78. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 212.
79. See id. at 216-20.
80. Id. at 214 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)). The Fifth Circuit stated that the Rule
6(e) secrecy requirement applies to information disseminated from grand jury transcripts
as well as anything that "may tend to reveal what transpired before the grand jury." Id. at
216 (citing United States v. Armco Steel Corp., 458 F. Supp. 784, 790 (W.D. Mo. 1978)).
For further discussion of the meaning of "matters occurring before [a] grand jury," see
Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ex rel. JudiciaryComm. v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that secrecy is violated when confidential information concerning the grand jury or its investigation is disclosed).
81. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 217. Rule 6(e) prohibits disclosure by "[a] grand juror, an
interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes
recorded testimony, an attorney for the [g]overnment, or any person to whom disclosure
is made under paragraph (2)(A)(ii) of this subdivision." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). The
Rule does not, however, prevent a grand jury witness from disclosing his testimony. See
Lance, 610 F.2d at 217.
82. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 219.
83. See id. The court noted that both a grand jury target seeking a dismissal of his
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government presented any evidence to rebut the presumption that the
unauthorized disclosures did in fact occur.84
The Fifth Circuit found that if a grand jury target establishes a prima
facie case of Rule 6(e) misconduct and the government fails to deny the
truthfulness of the disclosures, the target is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. 8' The Fifth Circuit further held that if the court finds a secrecy
rule violation pursuant to the evidentiary hearing, Rule 6(e) authorizes
the imposition of civil contempt sanctions to compel compliance with the
Rule.86 The Fifth Circuit concluded that Lance had established a prima
facie case against the government. 817 However, it remanded to the district
court the question of whether Lance's showing would warrant an evidentiary hearing if the government were to file an affidavit denying its improper disclosure of grand jury information."'
The Fifth Circuit did not discuss explicitly the full scope of the contempt remedy under Rule 6(e). By concluding, however, that Lance's
motion for sanctions was civil in nature, 89 that a target has the right to
request relief in the form of civil contempt sanctions for a Rule 6(e) violation, 90 and that a target is entitled to an evidentiary hearing upon a sufficient prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation, 9' the court implicitly

investigation and a criminal defendant seeking a dismissal of his indictment have a higher
prima facie burden of proof than a target seeking contempt sanctions. See id. Contempt
sanctions to punish violations of the Rule or to compel compliance with the Rule are unlikely to interfere with the grand jury process, whereas dismissal of the grand jury investigation or the criminal indictment obviously would. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 220-21. In addition, the court noted that, even if the government filed
an affidavit denying the Rule 6(e) violations, a target might still be entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on the evidence he presented. See id. at 221.
86. See id. at 219-20. The court stated that the target's purpose in initiating the proceeding is the most important determinant as to whether the proceeding is characterized
as civil or criminal. See id. at 212. If the target's purpose is remedial, the proceeding is
civil. See id The court found that Lance's petition for contempt sanctions was civil in
nature. See id.
87. See id. at 220-21.
88. See id.; see also supra note 73 and accompanying text (describing Lance's prior
motion and correspondence to the court requesting relief from prosecutorial violations of
Rule 6(e)). The Fifth Circuit also concluded that because Lance was likely to suffer continuing harm from the government's repeated violations of Rule 6(e), he had standing to
appeal the district court's order before the completion of his criminal trial. See Lance,
610 F.2d at 212-13 (stating that Lance would be denied any meaningful remedy for the
government's Rule 6(e) violation if he were precluded from appealing the district court's
decision until after his acquittal or conviction in a criminal trial).
89. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 212.
90. See id. at 220-21.
91. See id.
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recognized that Rule 6(e) created a private right of action for equitable
relief enforceable in a civil contempt proceeding. 2
2. United States v. Eisenberg: Limiting the Scope of EquitableRelief
Available Under Rule 6(e)
In United States v. Eisenberg,' the Eleventh Circuit specifically addressed the limitations on equitable relief, including injunctive relief and
civil contempt sanctions, available to a grand jury target who has made a
prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation. 94 The court held that once
the prima facie threshold is met, a district court must hold an evidentiary
hearing.9 If the court makes certain findings, it may issue sanctions
and/or injunctive orders to prevent further wrongful disclosures to the
extent that such relief does not interfere with the grand jury process. 96
In Eisenberg, the targets filed a motion requesting injunctive relief and
other equitable sanctions, alleging that government representatives dis7
closed grand jury materials to the public in violation of Rule 6(e). The
district court concluded that the targets had established a prima facie
case under the Lance guidelines, and ordered the government to give the
targets' counsel a list of government officials who had access to confidential grand jury information. 98
The government appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order.99 The appellate court agreed with the district court
that a prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation required the district
court to entertain the targets' petition and to enjoin the government
from instigating further adverse publicity." ° The Eleventh Circuit found,

92. See id.; Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating
that Lance stands for the proposition that a target may bring suit for injunctive relief
against the individuals subject to Rule 6(e)(2)). According to the Eleventh Circuit in
Blalock, a target has standing to sue for injunctive relief under the Rule, but not for civil
contempt. See id. at 1550 (stating that a target has a private right to bring suit for injunctive relief but "there is no such thing as an independent cause of action for civil contempt;
civil contempt is a device used to coerce compliance with an in personam order").
93. 711 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1983).
94. See id. at 960-61.
95. See id. at 964-65.
96. See id.; see also infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure required to impose the appropriate relief).
97. See Eisenberg, 711 F.2d at 961-62.
98. See id. at 961-63. The district court also enjoined any unauthorized persons from
publicizing grand jury materials and ordered the government attorneys to instruct grand
jurors to ignore any publicity surrounding the investigation. See id. at 961-62.
99. See id. at 966.
100. See id. at 964.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 47:237

however, that the scope of the civil remedies granted to the targets were
too broad under the Rule.'O
The Eleventh Circuit first outlined the procedure that a court must
follow once a target demonstrates a prima facie case for a Rule 6(e) violation."" A court must consider whether the government engaged in the
prohibited activities. 10 3 In addition, the court must determine whether
'''
the disclosure concerned "'matters occurring before the grand jury." 04
If the court makes affirmative findings on these issues, it is required to
order the relief necessary to stop the unlawful disclosures.' 5
The Eleventh Circuit held that in determining the scope of civil remedies under Rule 6(e), a target's personal interest in protecting his reputation should be weighed against the public's interest in the investigation
of criminal activities."' 6 After considering these two competing interests,
a court should grant civil remedies that are carefully crafted to prevent
prejudicial publicity without interfering with the grand jury process. 7 In
Eisenberg, the Eleventh Circuit determined that, while the district court
could require the government to furnish a list of names of government
agents to the court, it could not force the government to furnish the list
to the targets'
counsel because that action would interfere with the investigation."°
Although both the Fifth Circuit in Lance and the Eleventh Circuit in
Eisenberg implied that a target has a private right of action for civil relief
under Rule 6(e),'0 9 neither circuit adequately explained its reasoning. "

101. See id. at 965-66.
102. See id. at 964-66.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 964-66.
107. See id. at 966 (explaining that the court would not countenance violations of the
secrecy rule, but a target's right to seek redress for Rule 6(e) violations is limited).
108. See id. at 964. An unindicted target's only legitimate interests are to enjoin pretrial publicity and to punish Rule 6(e) violators. See id. Permitting counsel for an unindicted target to receive such a list serves no valid purpose while the grand jury is still investigating the alleged criminal activities. See id. Once the court finds a Rule 6(e) violation, however, the target is entitled to the name(s) of the violator(s) in order to
participate effectively in the subsequent evidentiary hearing concerning the scope and
nature of relief that may be afforded as a result of the violation. See id. at 965.
109. See Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1550-51 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that
according to Lance, a target may not seek only civil contempt sanctions for Rule 6(e)
violations, but also may initiate a civil action for injunctive relief and use contempt to
compel compliance with any court order granted); Eisenberg,711 F.2d at 964-65.
110. See Eisenberg, 711 F.2d at 964-65 (examining limitations on the court's supervisory power over the grand jury and the government rather than the limitations on the na-
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The courts merely concluded that if the target successfully establishes a
prima facie case, an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine the
appropriate remedy-contempt sanctions and/or injunctive relief."
3. Blalock v. United States: A Framework for Analysis
Both prior and subsequent to the 1977 amendment of Rule 6(e), federal courts used contempt sanctions against violators of the grand jury
secrecy rule."' Federal courts also have employed injunctive relief to
remedy Rule 6(e) violations." The federal circuit courts prior to Blalock, however, provided little guidance concerning the statutory limits of
the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy.1 In Blalock, the majority and specially
concurring opinions provided a framework for discussing the scope of
the Rule 6(e) contempt provision."'

ture and scope of its power to enforce a private cause of action under Rule 6(e)); Lance v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding only that
a target has the right to seek civil remedies for Rule 6(e) violations once a prima facie
case is established); see also Peterson, supra note 1, at 294 (discussing the Eisenberg
court's failure to analyze the scope of Rule 6(e) remedies).
111. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1551; Eisenberg, 711 F.2d at 964; Lance, 610 F.2d at 22021. Note, however, that a target who seeks certain forms of pre-indictment relief under
Rule 6(e), such as the dismissal of an indictment or the quashing of a subpoena, has a
higher prima facie burden of proof than a target who seeks contempt sanctions under this
Rule. See Lance, 610 F.2d at 219. Both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits state that certain
pre-indictment requests for injunctive relief may interfere with grand jury proceedings,
and, thus, may be inappropriate responses to a Rule 6(e) violation. See Eisenberg, 711
F.2d at 964; Lance, 610 F.2d at 219. Injunctive relief, however, may be appropriate to
prevent prejudicial publicity as long as such relief does not conflict with the grand jury
process. Cf. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d at 966 (describing the judiciary's obligation to limit the
Rule 6(e) remedies "to the extent necessary to stop the publicity and punish the offenders"); Lance, 610 F.2d at 219-20 (noting that a court is required to take into consideration
the scope of the requested relief and whether and to what extent it interferes with the
overall process of the grand jury).
112. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 294 (indicating that courts used contempt and
other remedies to sanction violations of the grand jury secrecy rule both before and after
the 1977 amendment).
113. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing injunctive relief as an appropriate response to Rule 6(e) violations).
114. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 294 (noting that the cases and commentary prior to
Blalock provided insufficient insight into congressional intent concerning the scope of
contempt remedies under the 1977 Rule 6(e) amendment).
115. See id. at 301 (noting that the Blalock opinion focuses on the scope of the Rule
6(e) contempt power); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188,
1196 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit in Blalock "crystallizes the relevant Rule 6 issues").
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a. The Blalock Majority: Rule 6(e) Authorizes a Private Right of
Action to Enforce the Contempt of CourtRemedy
In Blalock v. United States,1 6 the target moved to enjoin the grand
jury's investigation of alleged criminal activities, arguing that the government violated Rule 6(e) on several grounds." 7 The district court reviewed the evidence against
the prosecutor and denied the target's mo1 18
tion for injunctive relief.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Lance was binding precedent and affirmed the district court's decision
denying injunctive relief.1 9 The Blalock majority found that because
Lance held that a target has the right to petition the court for civil contempt sanctions for Rule 6(e) violations, it necessarily followed that a
target has a private right to bring suit for injunctive relief against Rule
6(e) violators and may invoke the court's civil contempt power to compel
compliance with any injunction the court grants.2 The court noted that,
in seeking injunctive relief, a target must first establish a prima facie case
against the alleged Rule 6(e) offender before a court will grant an evi-

116. 844 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1988).
117. See id. at 1548. First, the target alleged that the prosecutor and several FBI
agents leaked confidential grand jury material to unauthorized individuals. See id. Second, the target claimed that the prosecutor informed one of the target's competitors that
the target would soon be indicted by the grand jury. See id. at 1550. Third, the target
contended thatthe government interrogated potential witnesses with unauthorized persons present. See id.
118. See id. at 1549. In discussing the district court's actions, the Eleventh Circuit
stated that, even if the government had violated Rule 6(e), injunctive relief was inappropriate since the target had an adequate remedy at law in the event the grand jury indicted
him; for example, he could move to dismiss the indictment. See id. at 1549-50; see also
supra note 34 (discussing the various tests, including the adequacy test, that courts will
consider in determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief). In addition to the adequacy test, the irreparable harm rule, and the balancing of equities and hardships, courts
also have concluded that injunctive relief for violations of Rule 6(e) is inappropriate if it
interferes with the grand jury process. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1549; cf. Eisenberg, 711
F.2d at 965-66 (stating that the court is required to limit any civil relief that interferes
with the grand jury process); Lance, 610 F.2d at 219 (stating that a target must meet a
heavier prima facie burden when asking for types of relief that have a greater potential to
interfere with grand jury proceedings).
119. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1548, 1550 & n.6. The Eleventh Circuit was created out
of the former Fifth Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.
1981). In Bonner, the Eleventh Circuit held that all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
that were made before October 1, 1981 were binding precedent on the Eleventh Circuit.
See id. at 1209. Thus, the "prior panel rule" dictates that a Fifth Circuit panel decision
made on or before September 30, 1981 is binding precedent on all Eleventh Circuit panel
decisions until such time as the prior decision is overruled by the circuit sitting en banc.
See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1552 n.2.
120. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1550-51.
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dentiary hearing."' 1 If the target has made a prima facie showing and the
court has granted an evidentiary hearing, the court must then determine
at the hearing whether the alleged violator actually breached the Rule
and, if so, what relief was necessary. 112
If the court ultimately orders the requested relief, the target may then
attempt to compel compliance by invoking the court's contempt pow123
114
ers.
Using the prima facie factors outlined in Lance, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the target failed to meet the prima facie threshold,
and
125
affirmed the district court's decision denying injunctive relief.
b. The Blalock Special Concurrence:No Injunctive Relief, No Civil
Contempt, No Private Right of Action-Only Criminal Contempt
Is Contemplated Under Rule 6(e)
In an unusual decision, Judges Tjoflat and Roettger-the two judges
who wrote the Blalock majority opinion-expressed a separate view in a
concurring opinion.12 ' The judges concurred in the majority's judgment
affirming the district court's decision to deny injunctive relief to the target. 117 The Blalock special concurrence reasoned, however, that since
Rule 6(e) provides no private right of action for equitable relief, there is
no corresponding right under Rule 6(e) to invoke civil contempt to com-

121. See id. at 1551.
122. See id.
123. See id. Although Rule 6(e) provides the target with a right of action to seek injunctive relief, civil contempt standing alone does not form a separate basis to bring suit
in federal court. See id. at 1550-51. The court specifically stated that civil contempt is
used to compel compliance with a prior order, but may not form a basis for an independent cause of action. See id. at 1550.
124. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for a
prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation).
125. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1551-52 (concluding that the target did not meet one of
the prima facie requirements-that federal agents had disclosed information concerning
"matters occurring before the grand jury"). The court also noted that the target had an
adequate remedy at law, thus making injunctive relief inappropriate. See id. at 1549. In
addition, the court stated that if certain prerequisites to a finding of injunctive relief were
not met (for example, that further injury to the plaintiff was likely), no injunction would
issue. See id. Therefore, even if a target establishes a prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e)
violation, and the court grants an evidentiary hearing, injunctive relief will not necessarily
be ordered. See id. at 1549, 1552; see also supra note 34 (discussing the nature and scope
of the injunctive remedy and the factors considered in issuing such relief).
126. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1548, 1552; (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring). see also Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Blalock decision was unusual because the same two judges
wrote the majority as well as the concurring opinions).
127. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1552 (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring).
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pel compliance with such relief."' According to the Blalock special concurrence, the target's claim for relief was dismissed properly because the
target did not have a private right of action under Rule 6(e). 129 The concurrence concluded that if the Eleventh Circuit had not been bound by
Lance pursuant to a prior panel rule, the Blalock majority would have
rejected the Lance ruling and underlying rationale as invalid. 30
The Blalock special concurrence stated that to conclude that the contempt remedy under Rule 6(e) contemplates more than criminal contempt required a convoluted deductive argument.'
The concurrence
concluded that this argument was invalid because it rested upon a false
assumption, namely that Rule 6(e) authorizes injunctive relief and that a
civil 2contempt remedy also exists to compel compliance with such re13
lief.
According to the Blalock special concurrence, several reasons support
the conclusion that Rule 6(e) contemplates only criminal contempt sanctions and does not include injunctive relief or a corresponding civil contempt remedy.'33 It first noted that courts had been prosecuting violations of the grand jury secrecy rule as criminal contempt for eighty
128. See id. at 1555. The Blalock special concurrence agreed with the Blalock majority opinion, stating that civil contempt alone does not form a basis for a private cause of
action, but may be used to enforce compliance with an injunctive order. See id. The Blalock special concurrence argued, however, that Rule 6(e) does not provide "a target the
right to obtain an injunctive order of any kind." Id. Accordingly, the Blalock special concurrence reasoned that because there is no right to an injunctive remedy under Rule 6(e),
there is no right to civil contempt sanctions to compel compliance with such relief under
Rule 6(e). See id. The concurrence expressly stated that:
Rule 6(e)(2)'s prohibition against grand jury disclosures is not itself an adjudicative order; it did not issue in a "case or controversy" between.., the target and
the members of the grand jury. The prohibition is statutory. Absent a lawsuit in
which the plaintiff seeks an injunction embodying the terms of the prohibition,
the prohibition cannot possibly become an adjudicative order.
Id. at 1555 n.10.
129. See id. at 1552-53. (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring).
130. See id.; see also supra note 119 (discussing the prior panel rule).
131. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1555. (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring)
The Blalock special concurrence argued that in order for the Lance holding to be valid,
the court must assume that: (1) Rule 6(e) allows the imposition of civil contempt to compel compliance with its statutory requirements of secrecy; (2) that Congress empowered
courts with the authority to prevent persons subject to the Rule from wrongfully disclosing grand jury materials; (3) that injunctive relief must be entered in Article III litigation
because it is adjudicative, not administrative; and (4) that the target is the appropriate
party to seek injunctive relief because the secrecy rule is designed to protect such persons.
See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1552-62 (discussing the arguments against providing civil relief under
Rule 6(e)).
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years;3 4 Congress's inclusion of a contempt remedy simply codified
3
Second, the Blalock special concurrence noted
common law practice."
and "punished" in Rule 6(e) further sup"knowing"
that the language
ported the argument that Congress intended only criminal contempt
sanctions to apply to Rule 6(e) violations. 3 6 Because "knowing" implies
that criminal intent is a requirement for Rule 6(e) violations, and only
criminal contempt requires criminal intent, the concurrence argued that
the "knowing" language means that Rule 6(e) provides only a criminal
contempt remedy for its violation."' The concurrence further stated that
because criminal contempt is punitive while civil contempt is remedial,
the language "punished" means that the contempt remedy is punitive,
and thus criminal.' The Blalock special concurrence also claimed that
civil remedies fail to prevent violations of grand jury secrecy, because
subvert the secrecy interests that Rule 6(e)(2) atsuch remedies can
139
protect.
to
tempts

134. See id. at 1556-57.
135. See id. at 1557. The Blalock special concurrence noted that even after Congress
codified the secrecy rule, courts continued to punish Rule 6(e) violations as criminal contempts. See id.
136. See id. at 1558.
137. See id. (citing McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949), for
the proposition that civil contempt does not require a showing of criminal intent).
138. Cf. id. (arguing that criminal contempt is designed to punish a contemptuous act).
The Blalock special concurrence cited the Senate Judiciary Committee's use of punitive
language in its report issued on the proposed Rule 6(e) amendments as further evidence
that criminal contempt is the sole remedy for a Rule 6(c) violation. See id.; see also S.
REP. No. 95-354, at 8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 531 (stating that the
Rule "provid[es] a clear prohibition, subject to the penalty of contempt" (emphasis
added)).
139. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1559-60; see also id. at 1560 n.21 (demonstrating by hypothetical the "futility" of invoking civil contempt to guarantee secrecy). The Blalock
special concurrence stated that a civil contempt proceeding would be ineffective in coercing compliance with Rule 6(c). See id. at 1559. To illustrate this point, the concurrence constructed a hypothetical in which a prosecutor is held in civil contempt because
he leaked grand jury materials. See id. at 1559-60. In this example, the court chose to imprison the government attorney to compel compliance with the grand jury secrecy requirement. See id. at 1559. In order to prevent the prosecutor's incarceration from being
interpreted as punishment for past misconduct, the court advises the prosecutor, in accordance with traditional civil procedures, that if he stops making further disclosures of
grand jury matters, he can be relieved of the contempt and released from imprisonment.
See id. In this scenario, one possible outcome is that the court accepts the proffered assurances and the contemnor is released from custody. See id. at 1559-60. At the other
end of the spectrum, the prosecutor's promise to obey the grand jury secrecy requirement
is rejected by the court as unworthy of belief on account of the prosecutor's past misconduct. See id. at 1560. As analyzed by the Blalock special concurrence, either outcome
evidences the ineffectiveness of civil contempt as a way to guarantee grand jury secrecy.
See id. In the worst case, the proceeding is improperly transformed from a civil to a
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The Blalock special concurrence concluded that because injunctive relief is unavailable under Rule 6(e), civil contempt remedies also are unavailable. 40 Thus, when a target of a grand jury investigation seeks injunctive relief, a court must dismiss the application for such relief
14
because it fails to set forth a claim upon which a court may grant relief. '
The concurrence in Blalock specifically focused on the scope of the
contempt remedy contemplated under Rule 6(e). 42 However, the concurring judges stated that the prior panel rule forced the court to follow
Lance."' Thus, in light of the prior panel rule qualification and the uncriminal contempt process in which the prosecutor is punished for past misconduct. See
id. In the best case, all that has been accomplished is that a district court has requested
and secured a prosecutor's promise to comply with the legal obligation already imposed
upon him. See id. at 1559-60.
The Blalock special concurrence noted that an even more onerous outcome can flow
from a civil contempt proceeding. See id. at 1560 n.21. In particular, the concurrence
constructed another hypothetical in which the target successfully obtains a civil injunction
against the prosecutor and subsequently seeks to have the prosecutor held in civil contempt due to a newly alleged breach of the secrecy requirement. See id. As the concurrence explained, the prosecutor cannot effectively defend against the target's contempt
motion without explaining that the alleged disclosures "were not disclosures of matters
before the grand jury." Id. at 1561 n.21. To do so, however, would require that the
prosecutor reveal the substance of the grand jury's investigation to the moving party-the
very subject of the grand jury's inquiry-thus frustrating grand jury secrecy. See id.
Therefore, according to the Blalock special concurrence, only criminal contempt is contemplated under Rule 6(e). See id. at 1560.
140. See id. at 1555.
141. See id. at 1561 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). The Blalock special concurrence
noted, however, that a target has the means to stop wrongful disclosure of grand jury materials. See id. Even though a target may not apply for civil relief for Rule 6(e) violations, he is allowed to bring the improper disclosure to the attention of the court. See id.
Once notified, the court may exercise its inherent supervisory powers over grand jury
matters to ensure adherence to the secrecy rule. See id. The concurrence explained that
once a court finds sufficient evidence of a violation, it may impose criminal contempt
sanctions under 18 U.S.C. § 401. See id. Alternatively, the target may notify the United
States Attorney of the improper disclosure, who is empowered to seek an indictment
based upon 18 U.S.C. § 401 or under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 for obstruction of justice. See id. &
n.22; infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (noting that the Fourth Circuit in Finn v.
Schiller also found that a target has the right to request that the court investigate the alleged violative behavior and issue appropriate civil relief, including injunctions and civil
contempt sanctions, but also holding that a target does not have a private right of action
to pursue such relief).
The Blalock special concurrence further noted, however, that if the district court or the
prosecutor refuses to act subsequent to notice of the improper disclosure, the target has
no right of appeal. See 844 F.2d at 1561. The initiation of a criminal contempt proceeding
is within the court's or the prosecutor's sole discretion, not the target's. See id.
142. See Blalock, 844 F.2d. at 1552-62; see also Peterson, supra note 1, at 301 (noting
the concerns of the Blalock special concurrence).
143. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1552-53 (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring)
(noting that the interpretation of Rule 6(e) to include an injunctive remedy enforceable
under the court's power of civil contempt was unreasonable, but that the court was bound
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usual special concurrence in Blalock, the issue of whether Rule 6(e) contemplated injunctive relief and/or civil contempt remedies, and whether
such relief could be pursued through a private action, remained unresolved.
4. Barry v. United States: A Private Right of Action for Civil Relief is
"Cognizable" Under Rule 6(e)
a. The Barry Majority: Followingthe Lance and Blalock Precedent
Washington, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry, the target of a federal grand
jury investigation, brought suit for injunctive relief and contempt sanctions under Rule 6(e) against government attorneys, who allegedly
leaked confidential grand jury materials to the press. 44 Barry requested
that the court hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether injunctive relief should be ordered to prevent further Rule 6(e) violations and
whether contempt sanctions should be imposed for the government's
prior Rule 6(e) violations. 14' The district court dismissed Barry's case,

holding that Barry failed to meet the prima facie threshold necessary to
pursue relief under Rule 6(e). 46
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the
district court,147 stating that Barry had established a prima facie case of a
violation of the grand jury secrecy rule and was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing. In reaching its holding, the court stated that a private cause of
action, either for equitable relief or civil contempt, is "cognizable" under
Rule 6(e).1 49 The D.C. Circuit noted that all circuits that had considered
the issue of remedies under Rule 6(e) determined that the Rule contemplates a private cause of action for injunctive relief or civil contempt
sanctions."" Like Blalock, however, it agreed that civil contempt standing alone cannot form the basis for a private cause of action."' The D.C.
by the ruling in Lance that Rule 6(e) does provide for injunctive relief enforceable by civil
contempt sanctions).
144. See Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
145. See id. at 1319. Barry requested that the court order the prosecutor to "show
cause" why contempt sanctions should not be imposed. See id. He also asked the court to
order the prosecutor to stop future wrongful disclosures. See id.
146. See id. at 1318; see also supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing the
factors necessary to establish a prima facie case for a Rule 6(e) violation under Lance).
147. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1326.
148. See id. The D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing to determine what relief, if any, was appropriate. See id.
149. See id. at 1321-22.
150. See id. at 1321.
151. See id. at 1322. The D.C. Circuit agreed with the Eleventh Circuit's assertion in

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 47:237

Circuit agreed with the decisions in Lance and Blalock, interpreting
those cases to support the proposition that a target may bring a private
suit for equitable relief for Rule 6(e) violations and may invoke a court's
civil contempt powers to compel compliance with such orders."' The
court stated that, depending upon the nature of the violation, the appropriate relief for violations of Rule 6(e) includes both civil and criminal
contempt sanctions, as well as equitable relief."'
The D.C. Circuit summarized the proper legal framework to be used
in the event a target requests relief under Rule 6(e).'5 4 If the target establishes a prima facie case of a Rule 6(e) violation, the court isrequired
to hold an evidentiary hearing to allow the government to defend its actions."' If the government is unsuccessful at the hearing, the court must
determine whether equitable relief, civil contempt sanctions, or both are
156
appropriate.
The appropriate relief will depend on the extent and nature of the violation, and the likelihood that a particular form of relief
will deter future Rule 6(e) violations.' Such relief also must be carefully
tailored so as to avoid conflicts or unreasonable interference with the
grand jury process.18
Blalock that "'there is no such thing as an independent cause of action for civil contempt."' Id.; Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir. 1988). However, the
majority also stated that "a civil contempt sanction may include appropriate equitable
relief." Barry, 865 F.2d at 1324 n.7. Therefore, an injunctive-type civil contempt sanction
can form the basis for a private of action. Cf Id. at 1321 (stating that a claim "for equitable relief or civil contempt, is cognizable under Rule 6(e)(2)").
152. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1322; see also supra note 59 (discussing other federal circuit decisions which have held that injunctive relief may be available for Rule 6(e) violations).
153. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321-22. The D.C. Circuit recognized that "the literal
terms of Rule 6(e)(2) do not foreclose equitable relief, either in addition to, in conjunction with or in lieu of contempt sanctions, where the trial court finds that such relief is
warranted." Id. The court also stated that "a civil contempt sanction may include appropriate equitable relief." Id. at 1324 n.7. Thus, if the target sought to coerce compliance
with Rule 6(e), the appropriate remedy, according to the Barry majority, would be civil
contempt sanctions and/or injunctive relief. Cf id. at 1321-23, 1324 n.7 (acknowledging
that Rule 6(e) contemplates equitable relief or in the form of civil contempt and injunctions to remedy its violation). If the target's purpose was to punish the contemnor, then
the appropriate remedy would be criminal contempt. Cf. id. at 1324 (stating that criminal
contempt is a punitive remedy which is meant to punish a contemptuous act).
154. See id. at 1322-23.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 1323.
157. See id.
158. See id. For instance, a court may enjoin the government from future disclosures.
See id. It may also impose contempt sanctions for Rule 6(e) violations. See id. But it
should not, without good reason, order the "dissembling" of the grand jury or other relief
which substantially would interfere with the grand jury process. See id.
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b. The Barry Dissent: Joining Ranks With the Blalock Special
Concurrence
Dissenting, Judge Sentelle acknowledged that the majority decisions in
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits supported the majority holding in
Barry.5 9 Nonetheless, he agreed with the logic and analysis of the Blalock special concurrence, arguing that injunctive relief and civil contempt
sanctions were unavailable under Rule 6(e).' ° Judge Sentelle, like the
Blalock special concurrence, concluded that criminal contempt is the exclusive remedy for violations of the grand jury secrecy rule.6
The Barry decision substantially contributed to the debate over the
scope of the contempt remedy under Rule 6(e). 162 The Barry majority
provided further support for the proposition that actions for injunctive
relief, enforceable through civil contempt sanctions, were available under Rule 6(e). 163 The evidence suggests, however, that the Blalock court
would not have followed Lance in the absence of the prior panel rule requirement. 64 In addition, at the time of the Barry decision, the D.C. Circuit was the only circuit to hold without qualification that Rule 6(e) contemplates a private cause of action for injunctive relief following a
violation and that a court's contempt power may be invoked to enforce

159. See id. at 1326 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 1327.
161. See id. at 1326 (stating that the contempt sanction provided for in Rule 6(e) is not
civil, but criminal in nature); see also supra notes 126-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Blalock special concurrence).
162. See Peterson, supra note 1, at 301 (stating that the decisions in Blalock and Barry
focused on the scope of the Rule 6(e) contempt provision); see also supra note 114 (noting
that federal circuit court precedent prior to Blalock provided little guidance on the parameters of the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy).
163. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321 (stating that all of the federal circuit courts that have
addressed the scope-of-contempt issue have indicated that both injunctive relief and civil
contempt may be sought in a private cause of action based on Rule 6(e)).
164. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1552-53 (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring);
see also Barry, 865 F.2d at 1327 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The Barry majority, however,
disagreed with such a narrow reading of Rule 6(e). See id. at 1324 n.6. The Barry court
found that Rule 6(e) contemplates substantially more than criminal contempt. See id. at
1321-22. It argued that the Rule does not expressly or impliedly restrict the contempt
remedy. See id. In addition, none of the other circuits has limited the Rule 6(e) remedy
to criminal contempt. See id. Finally, limiting Rule 6(e) to criminal contempt would be
redundant, as courts already have the inherent and organic power to punish criminal contempt. See id. at 1324 n.6 (citing United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293
(1947)).
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the relief obtained."' Thus, the scope of the Rule 6(e)
66 contempt remedy
remained relatively unclear prior to Finn v. Schiller.'

II.

FINN V. SCHILLER: REFINING THE SCOPE OF THE RULE 6(E)
CONTEMPT REMEDY

The Finn court joined the Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, in part,
when it held that the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy includes both criminal

contempt, civil contempt, and injunctive relief enforceable by civil contempt. 167 The Fourth Circuit concluded, however, that even though Rule
6(e) provided for civil contempt, this civil contempt remedy did not give
rise to a private cause of action for equitable relief6
Mark Finn served on the board of trustees of the Virginia Retirement
System (VRS) during the period when it acquired significant stock in a
railroad company. 69 David Schiller, an Assistant United States Attor70
ney, initiated a grand jury investigation of the stock acquisitions.
Schiller also targeted a third party in connection with the investigation,
ultimately charging him with mail fraud. 17' Finn was not named in the

165. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321-22. The Fifth Circuit in Lance held only that a target,
upon a prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation, has the right to require the court to
hold an evidentiary hearing to allow the alleged offenders to rebut the prima facie case.
See Lance v. United States Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1980). The
Lance court noted that if the court finds that a violation has occurred, it may hold the offender in civil contempt and sanction him. See id. Drawing from the Lance decision, the
Eleventh Circuit in Blalock implied a target's private right of action to seek injunctive
relief against those subject to Rule 6(e), and that this injunction is enforceable through
the court's contempt powers. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1551. However, the Blalock majority specifically concluded that Rule 6(e) does not contemplate a right of action based
solely on civil contempt. See id. at 1550.
166. 72 F.3d 1182 (4th Cir. 1996).
167. Cf id. at 1188 (concluding that Rule 6(e) contemplates both civil and criminal
contempt, as well as injunctions to prevent future prohibited disclosures). The Fourth
Circuit explained that both criminal and civil contempt are available to remedy Rule 6(e)
violations. See id. The court also implied that injunctive relief is a part of the civil contempt relief and, as such, would be available to prevent future Rule 6(e) violations. See
id.; see also Barry, 865 F.2d at 1324 n.7.
168. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1188. In this respect, the outcome pursuant to the Finn
holding is paradoxical, because the Fourth Circuit also recognized that, in a case involving
egregious facts, a court must take remedial action. See infra note 194 (discussing the rationale for the Finncourt's conclusion); see also infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text
(discussing the circumstances surrounding the government's investigation of Finn).
169. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1185. From May 1990 through August 1990, the VRS acquired stock on the open market in the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad
Corporation. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
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criminal information filed against the third party. 12 Schiller subsequently
filed an eighty-three page statement in the government's case against the
third party. 173 Only six pages of the statement directly concerned the
third party. 17 The remaining seventy-seven pages alleged that Finn conspired to commit fraud with other VRS officials in the stock acquisition.17' The following day, a local newspaper published Finn's picture on
its front page under a headline proclaiming the alleged fraudulent stock
acquisition.176
Finn filed a civil injunctive action against Schiller, alleging prosecutorial misconduct, and claiming that the statement disclosed secret grand
jury materials in violation of Rule 6(e).' 7 In order to stop Schiller from
further violating the Rule, Finn sought both preliminary and permanent
injunctions. Finn also requested that the statement be struck from the
record and that the grand jurors be polled as to whether they were
prejudiced against him by the unauthorized disclosures. 179 The district
court dismissed Finn's complaint, ruling that it failed to allege a supportable claim for relief. 8 ° The court also stated that Rule 6(e) contemplated
only criminal contempt
and did not include any form of civil contempt or
8
injunctive relief.' '
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the court's dismissal of Finn's civil action,
concluding that Rule 6(e) did not provide a private cause of action for
relief.1 8 2 The court found, however, that the Rule necessarily provided

172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. Although Finn had not been charged with any crime, the statement expressly referenced Finn more than 370 times. See id. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that it was reasonable to conclude that the statement was filed "to pressure
[Finn] into a plea agreement." Id. at 1187 n.5.
176. See id. at 1185-86. Other newspaper articles referencing or quoting Schiller's
statement appeared for most of October 1994. See id. at 1186. In addition, a magazine
article incorrectly stated that Finn pled guilty to felony mail fraud in connection with the
stock acquisition. See id.
177. See id. at 1185.
178. See id. at 1186. A preliminary injunction is an injunction granted by the court to
give temporary emergency relief to a petitioner. See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES,
supra note 34, § 2.10, at 106. A permanent injunction is granted to provide a final solution to the violation of a right. See id. An analysis of the specific requirements necessary
to obtain each type of injunction is outside the scope of this Note. See supra note 34 (providing a general discussion of the nature and scope of injunctive relief).
179. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1186.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 1191.

270
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for civil and criminal contempt remedies and injunctive relief at the
court's discretion in response to a Rule 6(e) violation in order to preserve grand jury secrecy. 18 Unlike the Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, the Fourth Circuit refused to recognize that a private cause of action could be implied from Rule 6(e).184
In refusing to recognize a private cause of action, the court relied on
Cort v. Ash, 85 in which the Supreme Court established four factors for
determining whether to imply a private remedy where a statute does not
expressly provide one.186 First, the Cort test requires that the statute es-

183. Cf.id. at 1188-89 (noting that contempt and injunctive remedies "may be required to afford complete relief" to the target and society because "compromising grand
jury secrecy is a serious matter"). The Fourth Circuit stated that, in certain circumstances, both civil and criminal contempt may be needed to provide relief for the alleged
wrongful disclosure of grand jury materials. See id. Criminal contempt may be required
to punish past Rule 6(e) violations and to vindicate the court's authority. See id. Civil
contempt may be necessary to prevent future disclosures. See id.; see also Gompers v.
Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911) (stating that "[clontempts are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal" and both may be appropriate to provide a target
with relief from wrongful disclosure).
The Finn court also stated that an injunctive order may be required to prevent further
disclosure of this information. See 72 F.3d at 1188. The court implied that the Rule, while
not granting a private cause of action, does allow for injunctive relief enforceable by civil
contempt. Cf.id. at 1189-90 (holding that a court has an affirmative duty to "take appropriate action to prevent further violations and to sanction the violator as provided by the
Rule" (emphasis added)); infra note 199 (quoting the Fourth Circuit's specific language in
defining the scope of relief under Rule 6(e)).
184. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1188. The court determined that a person may request that
the court investigate an alleged Rule 6(e) violation, but he may not bring a private suit
against an alleged offender. See id. The court further stated that the "clear language" of
the Rule does not provide for a private cause of action, and one cannot be implied. See
id. In support of this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit stated that if Congress did not intend
to provide a remedy, federal courts should not unilaterally engraft one onto the statute.
See id. (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 (1981)); see also Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130, 138 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that Congress
must have indicated explicitly that it wanted to provide a private remedy in order to justify incorporating a cause of action into the statute).
185. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Fourth Circuit stated that the measure of Congress's intent to provide a private cause of action under Rule 6(e) does not stem from the nature of
the contempt. Cf.Finn, 72 F.3d at 1187-88 (stating that the nature of the contempt provided in Rule 6(e) is not determinative of whether a private right of action is contemplated thereunder). Where a statute does not provide an express private remedy, a court
may imply such a remedy if the Cort factors are met. See id. at 1188-89.
186. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1188-89. Some post-Cort cases have noted that the primary
factor is whether the statute or legislative history indicates congressional intent to establish a private right of action. See id. at 1189 (citing Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771-72 (1981)). However, the preferred test for uncovering congressional intent still comprises all four Cort factors. See id. (citing Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 241 (1979)).
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tablish a "federal right" in the plaintiff's favor." 7 Second, a court must
find an express or implied legislative intent to establish a private remedy."' Third, a court must determine whether implying a private remedy
is consistent with the nature of the statute and the legislative purposes
for enacting the statute.'89 Finally, a court must decide whether the issue
falls within an area of traditional state regulation.' 9
Applying the first Cort factor, the Fourth Circuit found that Rule 6(e)
did not create a federal right in favor of an unindicted target."' The
court did acknowledge, however, that even though the grand jury secrecy rule exists to protect the grand jury process, part of that secrecy
requirement includes insulating the grand jury target from adverse publicity and damage to his reputation. 9' As to the second Cort factor, the
court found nothing to support the argument that Congress intended a
private remedy to arise from Rule 6(e).193 Because the Fourth Circuit
found that Finn's claim failed to meet two of the four factors of the Cort
test, the court concluded that no private remedy could be implied from
the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy. 94
The Finn court stated, however, that "compromising grand jury secrecy is a serious matter" and that Rule 6(e) was enacted to achieve one
of the purposes underlying grand jury secrecy-to protect an unindicted
target from overzealous prosecution and adverse publicity stemming
from such conduct. 95 Having rejected the concept of a private cause of
action, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless concluded that a target could seek
relief from a district court in connection with unlawful Rule 6(e) disclosures.1 6 The Fourth Circuit held that once a target established a Rule
6(e) prima facie violation by showing that the alleged offender know-

187. See id. at 1189 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
188. See id. (quoting Cort,422 U.S. at 78).
189. See id. (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78).
190. See id. (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78). If the issue concerns an area that is traditionally the concern of the states, inferring a remedy based on federal law would be inappropriate. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. (citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219
(1979)).
193. See id. The court stated that neither the Rule's language nor other evidence supports the contention that a right of private enforcement under Rule 6(e) may be implied.
See id. at 1188-89.
194. See id. at 1189 (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981))
(stating that because the first two Cort factors did not establish congressional intent to
create a private remedy, it was not necessary to do any further analysis under the test).
195. See id.
196. See id.
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ingly disclosed grand jury materials and that such person was subject to
Rule 6(e),1 97 the court "must take appropriate steps to determine
whether a violation has occurred."' 9 If a violation has occurred, a court
has an affirmative duty to stop future Rule 6(e) violations and/or to sanction the offender.' 99 Although the Finn court concluded that the district
court properly dismissed Finn's complaint, it remanded the case, directing the district court to investigate whether the contents of the statement
violated Rule 6(e) and, if so, to impose the appropriate equitable relief
and/or contempt sanctions. °
III. THE SCOPE OF THE RULE 6(E) CONTEMPT REMEDY

A. Solely CriminalContempt?
The Blalock special concurrence and the Barry dissent (Dissenters) offered several arguments to support the contention that the Rule 6(e)
contempt remedy is exclusively criminal.2 ' They asserted that the Rule's
plain meaning and legislative history belied any finding that Congress intended to provide for either civil contempt or a private right of action. 2°
The Dissenters also asserted that civil contempt sanctions were ineffective remedies for Rule 6(e) violations and, thus, Congress could not have
intended to provide for such relief under the Rule. 2" The Dissenters' arguments adopt an unnecessarily narrow view of the purpose and func197. See id. at 1189 n.7. The prima facie showing established by the Fourth Circuit in
Finn appears to be easier to meet than the prima facie requirements established by Lance
and Blalock. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84 (discussing the prima facie factors
established in Lance); Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Lance v. United States Dep't of Justice, 610 F.2d 202, 216 (5th Cir. 1980)).
198. See Finn,72 F.3d at 1189 (emphasis added).
199. See id. at 1189-90. A district court also has a duty to preserve the integrity of the
grand jury process. See id. at 1191. The Fourth Circuit stated that the court has the
authority to "impose such sanctions as it may find appropriate," and that it may also invoke its inherent civil and criminal contempt powers "if it finds that sanctions under Rule
6(e)(2) are not appropriate." Id. at 1191; see also supra note 34 (discussing the nature and
scope of equitable relief, including injunctions and civil contempt sanctions).
200. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1191. In October 1995, three months before the Fourth Circuit decided the Finn case, the federal government closed its investigation of the VRS and
cleared Finn and two other senior VRS officials of wrongdoing. See Spencer S. Hsu, Investigation of Va. Pension Fund Collapses; U.S. Studied Takeover of Real Estate Firm,
WASH. POST, Oct. 6,1995, at D3.
201. See Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1326-28 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting); Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1555-60 (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring).
202. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1328 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1555-60
(Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring).
203. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1326-28 (Sentelle, J.,dissenting); Blalock, 844 F.2d at
1559-60 (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring).
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tion of the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy. The Fourth Circuit in Finn, like
the federal circuit courts of appeal in Eisenberg, Blalock, and Barry, concluded that the language of Rule 6(e) supports a broader interpretation
of the contempt remedy-namely that it contemplates both criminal and
civil contempt sanctions as well as equitable relief to provide the necessary remedies for violations of the Rule. 0 4
1. The Plain Language of Rule 6(e)
The Dissenters argued that the requirement of a "knowing" violation
and the use of the term "punished" in the Rule indicated that Congress
intended only a criminal contempt remedy. However, the requirement
of intent, while a necessary element of a criminal contempt conviction,
does not by itself control whether the contempt remedy is civil or criminal.2°6 Although criminal intent is not required for a finding of civil contempt, civil contempt may nonetheless be based on criminal intent.0 7
Thus, criminal conduct may result in either criminal or civil contempt
sanctions. 208 Because either civil or criminal contempt may be based on
"knowing" conduct, Rule 6(e) does not necessarily envision solely crimi209
nal contempt.
The Dissenters also argued that the use of the term "punished" weighs
in favor of criminal contempt as the exclusive remedy for Rule 6(e) violations. 10 According to the Dissenters, the term "punished" implied a
punitive sanction and, therefore, the contempt remedy must be criminal." The Supreme Court, however, continued to struggle with the dis-

204. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1188; accord Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321-22; Blalock, 844 F.2d at
1550-51; cf. United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 964 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that
upon a prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation, a court should "order the government to take steps to stop any [future violations]").
205. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1327-28; Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1558.
206. See United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 534 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting United
States v. Rose, 806 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (asserting that willful conduct is not a prerequisite for establishing civil contempt, but civil contempt could be based
on willful conduct).
207. See id.
208. See id. (quoting United States v. Rose, 806 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986)).
209. Cf. id. (holding that while "willfulness" is an element of criminal contempt, willful conduct may be addressed by both civil and criminal contempt; therefore, the court
may use both types of sanctions under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3)).
210. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1328 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1558-59
(Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring).
211. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1558-59 (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring)
(stating that the purpose of criminal contempt is to punish misconduct, while the purpose
of civil contempt is to coerce compliance with an equitable order, not to punish prior
wrongful behavior); see also Barry, 865 F.2d at 1327 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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tinction between criminal and civil contempt, concluding that distinguishing between the two types is often difficult. 2 2 Civil contempt sanctions may contain aspects that are punitive in nature, while, at times,
criminal contempt sanctions may be remedial. 21' Given this uncertainty,
Congress's use of the term "punished" in Rule 6(e) does not establish
conclusively that the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy is criminal.2 4
Consistent with the Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, the Fourth Circuit in Finn determined that the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy encompassed both civil and criminal contempt, as well as injunctive relief enforceable by civil contempt.215 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because
the language of the/, Rule
does not differentiate between the two forms of
216
contempt remedies, both forms, along with injunctive relief, may be
necessary to provide the appropriate remedy, and, therefore, Rule 6(e)
authorizes substantially more than criminal contempt to punish and/or
remedy violations of the Rule.217

212. See United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827-28 (1994)
(stating that there is no bright-line test in distinguishing between civil and criminal contempts); see also Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A
New Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempt, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1047 (1993)
(noting that the civil versus criminal contempt distinction is confusing).
213. See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 635 (1988) (stating that both civil
and criminal contempt cases have characteristics that are "remedial or punitive or both").
214. Cf United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 627 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that
"[p]unishment for civil contempt is usually considered to be remedial," thus supporting
the argument that a statute's or a court's language should not always be interpreted literally (emphasis added)).
The Blalock special concurrence also argued that Rule 6(e) is simply an affirmation
that the court's statutory criminal contempt authority under 18 U.S.C. § 401 applies to
violations of the grand jury secrecy rule. See Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1553 (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring). The Blalock special concurrence argued that § 401 explicitly provides for criminal sanctions for misconduct in judicial proceedings. See id. Courts,
however, have used this provision routinely as a basis for issuing criminal as well as civil
contempt sanctions. See, e.g., Downey v. Clauder, 30 F.3d 681, 685 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating
that 18 U.S.C. § 401 is the general statutory authority for civil and criminal contempt
sanctions); United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 765 n.13 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting the availability of civil contempt sanctions under 18 U.S.C. § 401); Coleman v. Espy, 986 F.2d
1184, 1190 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 401 allows the court to impose either
criminal or civil contempt sanctions); Ahmed v. Reiss Steamship Co., 761 F.2d 302, 305
(6th Cir. 1985) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 401 contemplates both civil and criminal contempt sanctions).
215. See Finn, 72 F.3d 1182, 1188 (4th Cir. 1996).
216. See id. The Fourth Circuit found that because Rule 6 does not "modify or qualify
in any way the phrase 'contempt of court,"' both civil and criminal contempt remedies
were available. [d.
217. See id.
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2. The Legislative History
The Dissenters further argued that the legislative history of Rule 6(e)
reflects a congressional intent to make criminal contempt the sole rem-

edy for violations of the Rule.2 '8 The legislative history of Rule 6(e),
however, neither explicitly nor implicitly provides' that
219 criminal contempt
was the exclusive remedy for violations of the Rule..
Adopting the 1977 amendment of Rule 6(e) involved several stages.
The initial proposal contemplated expanding the scope of persons to
whom grand jury materials could be disclosed, but did not provide a corresponding remedy against persons making unlawful disclosures.22 ° Congress subsequently rejected the initial proposal in favor of the current
version of Rule 6(e), which not only expanded the scope of disclosure of
grand jury materials, but also provided an express contempt remedy for
violations of the Rule. 221 Thus, the legislative history of Rule 6(e) suggests that Congress intended to protect persons subjected to increased
risk of exposure by providing a contempt remedy that implicitly included
civil remedies, such as civil contempt sanctions and injunctive relief, for
violations of the Rule 2
3. An Ill-Suited Remedy
The Dissenters also asserted that because civil contempt remedies, including injunctive relief, are designed to coerce or compel conduct, these
remedies are ill suited to prohibit or restrain violations of Rule 6(e). 23

218. See Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1556-57 (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring). The
Blalock special concurrence also argued that cases in the late 1800s indicated that grand
jury secrecy violations were penalized as criminal contempts. See id. (citing In re Summerhayes, 70 F. 769, 773-74 (N.D. Cal. 1895) (other citations omitted)). The Blalock special concurrence also noted that after the common law grand jury secrecy rule was incorporated into Rule 6(e), courts continued to penalize secrecy violations as criminal
contempts. See id. at 1557.
219. See generally S. REP. No. 95-354, at 5-8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
527, 529-30 (discussing congressional desire to institute sanctions for violations of the secrecy rule, but failing to delineate the scope of the remedy).
220. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing the initially proposed
1977 amendment of Rule 6(e)).
221. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing the initially proposed
1977 amendment of Rule 6(e)).
222. See supra note 55 (stating that the redrafted Rule is intended to provide a "clear
prohibition" against prosecutorial misuse of the grand jury).
223. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1328 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that civil contempt
would not be useful in remedying violations of Rule 6(e)); Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1559 (Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring) (stating that civil contempt would be ineffective
in compelling compliance with Rule 6(e) proscriptions); see also supra note 139 (discuss-

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 47:237

They argued that criminal contempt sanctions are better suited because
24
criminal sanctions are intended to prohibit conduct.
Criminal contempt, however, is designed to punish or penalize past misconduct, while
civil contempt is calculated to compel or coerce prescribed conductboth being required to prohibit future misconduct.225 The Finn court
cited an early Supreme Court case for the proposition that a district
court should have the discretion to utilize either civil or criminal
contempt sanctions to achieve a particular result.226 Moreover, Blalock,
Barry, and Finn all recognized that injunctive relief may be appropriate
to prevent future Rule 6(e) violations. Indeed, both types of contempt
sanctions, in addition to injunctive relief, may be necessary to provide
complete relief to the target. Because only one district court has found
the Dissenters' reasoning persuasive,228 court decisions after Finn likely
will conclude that Rule 6(e) contemplates both criminal and civil con-

ing several hypotheticals in which the Blalock special concurrence attempted to demonstrate the "futility" of invoking civil contempt to guarantee secrecy in grand jury proceedings).
224. See Barry, 865 F.2d at 1328 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); cf. Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1560
(Tjoflat & Roettger, JJ., specially concurring) (arguing that the imposition of civil contempt was insufficient to penalize Rule 6(e) violations and, therefore, criminal sanctions
were necessary).
225.

See DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON REMEDIES, supra note 34, § 2.9, at 97-98.

226. See Finn v. Schiller, 72 F.3d 1182, 1188 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Gompers v. Buck's
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911)).
227. See id.; Barry, 865 F.2d at 1321-22; Blalock, 844 F.2d at 1550-51.
228. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188, 1202 (E.D. Mich.
1990) (holding that Rule 6(e) authorizes criminal contempt sanctions for Rule 6(e) violations but not civil contempt sanctions or injunctive relief). Although the Fourth Circuit,
prior to its holding in Finn, had not directly addressed the scope of the Rule 6(e) contempt remedy, its prior Rule 6(e) decisions conflict with a narrow interpretation of the
Rule. See In re Charlotte Observer, 921 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that "a
court might well issue curative orders protecting the business and the secrecy of the grand
jury"); United States v. Coughlan, 842 F.2d 737, 740 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the contempt remedy is not the exclusive remedy for Rule 6(e) violations and that other remedies, such as suppressing grand jury materials, may be appropriate to effectively respond
to such violations).
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tempt sanctions as well as injunctive relief for grand jury secrecy violations. 2 9
B. More Than Criminaland Civil Contempt and Injunctive Relief?
1. Congress Intended to Create a Rule 6(e) Private Right of Action
The Finn court relied on the Cort v. Ash factors23 to determine
whether Rule 6(e) created a private cause of action, and concluded that
such a remedy could not be implied."' The first Cort factor is whether
the plaintiff is a member of the "class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted., 232 The Fourth Circuit found that Rule 6(e) was not
enacted for the particular benefit of unindicted targets.233 Contrary to
the Finn court's analysis, however, evidence suggests that the statute
does create a federal right in favor of grand jury targets subjected to unlawful grand jury disclosures, and that Congress did intend a private
234
remedy under the Rule.
It has long been recognized that a primary
reason for mandating secrecy in grand jury proceedings is to prohibit the
disclosure of confidential information, thus protecting an unindicted target.23 The Supreme Court also has found that secrecy works to prevent
adverse publicity against unindicted targets of grand jury investiga236
tions.
Because unindicted targets, such as Finn, are directly harmed by
the unlawful disclosure of grand jury materials, and because the secrecy
requirement exists in large part to discourage harmful disclosures and to
prevent adverse publicity, it is reasonable to conclude that grand jury

229. See supra note 228 (explaining that few courts have rejected injunctive relief as a
viable Rule 6(e) remedy); see also 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 8.5, at 156 (Supp.
1991) (stating that where a "target... believes that there has been unauthorized disclosure of [a] grand jury matter, that person may seek injunctive relief to preclude further

disclosure" or contempt sanctions).
230. Finn, 72 F.3d at 1188-89 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)); see also supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Cort factors).

231.

See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1189.

232.

Id. (emphasis in original).

233. See id.
234. See supra notes 23-24 (discussing the importance of secrecy in protecting unindicted targets).
235. See Pittsburgh Paint & Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1959)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying notes 23-24 (discussing the
reasons for secrecy in the American grand jury process).
236. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979); see also
United States v. Coughlan, 842 F.2d 737, 739 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Eisenberg,
711 F.2d 959, 961 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that an unindicted target's reputation is
protected by the grand jury secrecy rule); supra, notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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targets are within the group of persons for whose "especial benefit" the
Rule was enacted.2 7
The second Cort factor is whether the legislative history reveals a congressional intent to create a private right of action .238 The Finn court
concluded that there was no evidence of such intent to provide a private
remedy to a target under Rule 6(e). 239 An examination of the legislative
history, however, exposes Congress's intent to give persons harmed by
disclosure of grand jury materials an opportunity to object to such disclosure.240 The first draft of the 1977 amendment unilaterally expanded the
scope of persons to whom grand jury materials should be disclosed, while
providing no corresponding right to those who were harmed by such disclosure.' 4' Congress rejected this proposal and adopted the current version of Rule 6(e). 42 In the 1977 amendment, Congress expanded the
scope of permissible disclosure to facilitate law enforcement's contribution to grand jury proceedings and to encourage efficient investigations
without judicial delay.24'3 Fearing that such power would lead to abuse of
the grand jury process, Congress sought to balance such expansion by
providing an express contempt remedy. 2" The legislative history thus indicates that Congress intended that persons harmed or disadvantaged by
the relaxed
disclosure scheme were entitled to protection under Rule
6(e). 245

237. Cf.Finn, 72 F.3d at 1188-89 (acknowledging that the secrecy rule acts to protect
unindicted targets).
238. See id. at 1189.
239. See id.
240. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent in
enacting the 1977 amendment to Rule 6(e)).
241. See S. REP. No. 95-354, at 5-7 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 528-30;
see also supra note 27 (providing the original text of Rule 6(e), which limited the disclosure of grand jury materials solely to government attorneys).
242. See S. REP. No. 95-354, at 4,7; see also supra note 25 (providing the current version of Rule 6(e)).
243. See S. REP. No. 95-354, at 8; see also supra note 25 (discussing the present version of Rule 6(e)).
244. See S. REP. No. 95-354, at 8.
245. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent in
enacting the 1977 amendment to Rule 6(e)). In light of the federal judiciary's difficulties
in determining the scope of the Rule 6(e) remedy, the existence of its non-statutory, inherent powers to punish and provide relief through the use of contempt and injunctive
orders, and the effectiveness of a private remedy to preserve grand jury secrecy, Congress
should consider amending the Rule. This Note suggests that such an amendment should
expressly empower federal courts to regulate Rule 6(e) violations through criminal and
civil contempt sanctions and injunctive relief, and allow targets to enforce their right to
grand jury secrecy through a private cause of action.
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After applying two of the four Cort factors and concluding that Rule
6(e) would not sustain an implied private remedy, the Finn court determined that further analysis was unnecessary. 6 When properly analyzed,
however, the first two factors indicate Congress's intent to create a private remedy under Rule 6(e), and therefore, further analysis under the
Cort test is required.
The third Cort factor requires a determination of whether a private
247
right of action is compatible with the statute's fundamental purpose,
namely the preservation of grand jury secrecy.14s An unindicted target,
like Finn, hopes to invoke Rule 6(e) protection to prevent harm to his
reputation and avoid adverse publicity. 49 The Finn decision provided
that although a target may seek criminal and/or civil contempt sanctions,
as well as injunctive relief for violations of Rule 6(e), he does not have a
private enforcement remedy to pursue such relief under the Rule.5
Given the legislative purposes underlying the Rule, however, eliminating
relief in the form of a private remedy would be too restrictive.21 A private right of action to seek equitable relief, reinforced by the right to
seek civil contempt sanctions to compel compliance with such relief, is
essential to maintain grand jury secrecy. Because Rule 6(e)'s contempt
provision was not intended to be the exclusive remedy for violation of
the Rule, and because a private remedy would provide an additional
means to preserve grand jury secrecy, an implied right of action is consistent with Rule 6(e)'s underlying purposes.

246. Finn v. Schiller, 72 F.3d 1182, 1189 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing California v. Sierra
Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981), for the proposition that further examination is necessary
only if analysis of the first two factors signifies that Congress intended to create a private
remedy).
247. See id. (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
248. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979) (explaining that Rule 6(e) is intended to protect grand jury secrecy, and one of the primary
purposes of grand jury secrecy is to protect individuals from harmful disclosure of confidential grand jury materials).
249. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing the target's interests in
ensuring that grand jury secrecy be carefully maintained).
250. Finn, 72 F.3d at 1188-89 (stating that Rule 6(e) victims may ask the court to investigate and impose civil contempt sanctions, which may include injunctive relief, but
may not bring a private suit for such relief).
251. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (providing that violations "may be punished as a contempt of court"); see also supra note 25 (providing the full text of Rule 6(e)). Prior to
Finn, the Fourth Circuit had concluded that the contempt remedy was not intended to be
the exclusive remedy for grand jury secrecy violations. See supra note 228 (discussing
cases which support the proposition that injunctive remedies may be appropriate to respond to a Rule 6(e) contempt violation).
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The final Cort factor requires the court to determine whether the
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to the state's discretion.252
Because federal grand juries are governed exclusively by federal law, no
state remedies exist for violations of Rule 6(e),2 3 and, therefore, breach
of the grand jury secrecy rule is not an issue traditionally included within
a state's jurisdiction. Thus, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Finn, proper analysis of the Cort factors suggests that, in addition to civil
and criminal contempt sanctions and other equitable remedies, a private
right of action exists under Rule 6(e)'s contempt remedy.
2. No Private Right of Action, but an Affirmative Duty Nonetheless
Although the Finn court refused to find a private enforcement remedy
under Rule 6(e), its ruling may benefit grand jury targets by providing a
more practical, effective way to remedy Rule 6(e) violations. 2" The decisions in Blalock and Barry provided that a target may seek to invoke the
court's civil contempt power to coerce compliance with an injunctive order only after the target brings an action for injunctive relief.255 These
decisions imply that prosecutors get "one free misstep" before they are
subject to contempt sanctions."
The Finn procedure is arguably more straightforward, and the target's
relief more instantaneous. 57 According to the Fourth Circuit, the target
cannot file a private cause of action with the court, but can notify the
court of an alleged Rule 6(e) violation. 258 The target then must make a
prima facie showing of a Rule 6(e) violation.25 9 To establish such a case,
the petitioner must demonstrate that grand jury information was knowingly disclosed and that the source of the disclosure was subject to the
restrictions of Rule 6(e).26 If the petitioner is successful, the district
court "must" investigate 26 and, if it finds a Rule 6(e) violation has oc-

252. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1189 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
253. See supra note 1 (discussing the formation and governance of federal grand juries).
254. See Howard W. Goldstein, Remedies for Grand Jury Leaks, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 7,
1996, at 5-6.
255. See Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Blalock v.
United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1988).
256. Goldstein, supra note 254, at 6.
257. See id.
258. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1187, 1189; see also supra note 196-99 (discussing the procedural mechanism to invoke the court's contempt powers).
259. See Finn, 72 F.3d at 1189.
260. See id. at 1189 n.7.
261. See id. at 1189.
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curred, it is obligated to impose appropriate relief to remedy the violation.262 Such relief may consist of civil contempt sanctions and injunctive
orders to "stop further or future" Rule 6(e) violations as well as criminal
contempt sanctions to punish prior violations and to preserve the court's
263
authority over the matter.
The Finn holding nonetheless restricts an important private right in
the Fourth Circuit. Even though protecting an unindicted target is one
of the major justifications for the grand jury secrecy rule, the denial of a
private cause of action by the Finn court removed one effective means of
enforcing this policy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Ample evidence exists to support the contention that criminal and civil
contempt sanctions, as well as injunctive relief, are available to remedy
and punish violations of the Rule. Rule 6(e) also appears to provide a
private right of action to pursue such relief in order to protect the integrity of the grand jury process. The legislative history and case law contain little to disprove such a contention. It is more reasonable to assume
that Congress, recognizing the judiciary's inherent powers and expressly
providing that Rule 6(e) violations "may be punished by contempt," left
the courts free to fashion appropriate injunctive and contempt remedies
and that such remedies could be pursued through a private civil action.
The Finn case underscores the appropriateness of a private remedy for
violations of Rule 6(e). A civil suit creates the proper forum in which to
remedy a prosecutor's negligent disclosure of grand jury materials. Unindicted individuals are virtually bereft of any practical remedies at law,
yet the threat of injury to their reputations and livelihoods is immense.
Limiting the Rule 6(e) remedy to contempt and injunctive relief without
a private right of action to seek such relief would be fundamentally unfair and contrary to the principal goals of Rule 6(e): namely the preservation of grand jury secrecy for the overall benefit of society and the protection of unindicted grand jury targets.

262. See id. at 1188.
263. See id

